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No-Fault Death:
Wedding Inheritance Rights
to Family Values
Linda Kelly Hill'
The institution of marriage is the creation of morality. ... The association of man
and woman in wedlock has from time immemorial been of such importance in every
society that its regulation has always been a matter of morals. ... [W]hat obligations
the spouses should undertake towards each other are not questions which any society
has ever left to individuals to settle for themselves. They must be settled according to
the ideas of right and wrong which prevail in that society.
-Lord Patrick Devlin2
There must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief
and crude terms, not the law's business.
-H.L.A. Hart
3
INTRODUCTION
T HE morality of marriage presents terrific controversy. What is the state's
role in marriage? Can marriage be morally defined? At every critical
legal turn in a marriage, such issues present themselves. They resonate in
today's raging debates over same-sex marriage and who shall be afforded
the right to marry.4 They define the legal parameters of rights enjoyed dur-
ing marriage such as the right to contract, own property, or seek redress for
a crime or tort committed by one's spouse.' Questions regarding the legal
I Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. J.D., University of
Virginia, 1992; B.A. University of Virginia, 1988. Special thanks to Justin Evans for his meticu-
lous research assistance.
2 PATRICK DEVL N, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALS 61 (1965).
3 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 14-15 (1963) (quoting the 1954 Wolfenden
Report to the English Parliament). For further discussion of the Wolfenden report, see infra
note 132 and accompanying text.
4 For further discussion of same-sex marriage, see infra note 173 and accompanying
text.
5 For further discussion of rights within marriage, see infra notes 144-46 and
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enforcement of morality are also asked at the end of marriage. They have
6shaped the transformation of divorce law from a fault to a no-fault system.
And, while often overlooked, such moral issues are just as pivotal when a
marriage ends in death.
When a married individual dies without a will or certain property has
not or cannot be devised, a surviving spouse's marital conduct becomes
relevant in determining how the decedent's estate will be distributed. The
states' use of fault in probate runs the full gamut-from denying all inheri-
tance rights unless the surviving spouse is "totally free of fault"7 to awarding
the decedent's estate regardless of fault simply because one "blunders into
matrimony."' Between these extremes, the states' treatment of fault varies
as to what is defined as fault, who defines fault, and how probate benefits
are restricted. Notwithstanding the differences between the states, the use
of fault by any particular state may be justified as a matter of state privilege.
However, the exercise of state prerogative cannot be completely arbitrary.
In order for the use of fault in probate to withstand challenge, it must be
consistent with a state's application of fault in other contexts.
In at least two other areas, spousal behavior impacts monetary awards
which are determined by the state. When an employed spouse has died and
the employer can be held accountable, a surviving spouse may claim ben-
efits through workers' compensation laws. Such death benefits, however,
may be restricted by considerations of spousal behavior. Property distribu-
tion and alimony awards at divorce can also be affected by conduct deter-
minations. Yet a comparison of each state's probate, workers' compensa-
tion, and divorce law reveals little consistency in the evaluation of spousal
behavior.
To a certain extent, inconsistencies in the use of spousal misconduct
in the various legal contexts can be understood by distinguishing between
the types of harm which may be inflicted and the rationale behind con-
sidering the misconduct. For example, a spouse may engage in a physical
act of harm. Not surprisingly, murdering one's spouse typically precludes
inheritance rights.9 Economic misconduct, such as the intentional deple-
tion of marital assets, similarly results in a disproportionate division of as-
sets in order to compensate the "victimized" spouse at divorce.'0 However,
accompanying text.
6 For further discussion of the development of no-fault divorce and the tradition of fault,
see infra notes 101-04, 11 o-2o and accompanying text.
7 In re Succession of LaBorde, 540 So. 2d 966, 968 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis re-
moved); see also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2433 (zoo5) (forfeiture of marital fourth); LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 2437 (2005) (forfeiture of family allowance).
8 Whitehurst v. Whitehurst, 145 A. 204, 207 (Md. 1929).
9 For a discussion of the slayer statutes, see infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
io For a discussion of the distinction between economic misconduct and other fault con-
siderations in the divorce context, see infra note io and accompanying text.
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more "emotional harms" such as bigamy, adultery, abandonment, desertion,
or nonsupport may also be a basis for forfeiture of inheritance rights. In
these instances, the legal justification for recognizing the harm needs to
thoughtfully be considered. Forfeiture for emotional harm cannot always
be equated with fault. In certain instances, spousal behavior is considered
as an equitable matter. One example of equity may be precluding a biga-
mist spouse from inheriting." Similarly, the use of conduct considerations
throughout workers' compensation death benefits law may be more a mat-
ter of equity than a matter of fault. 2 Yet even after isolating solely the
instances in probate and dissolution in which the use of emotional harm
serves a punitive function, it remains difficult to justify.
Within each state, there is little consistency in the application of emo-
tional fault in probate and dissolution." Yet when the states apply fault con-
siderations consistently, the legal enforcement of a code of private morality
still raises serious policy questions. Should the state be engaged in regulat-
ing private marital behavior? What objective does enforcement of a marital
code hope to achieve? Are certain behaviors being enforced because they
represent moral truths or for more utilitarian reasons? Is legal enforcement
an effective mechanism for promoting morality? And, perhaps most funda-
mentally, does society share a common morality about marriage?
The first three sections of this article present a detailed and compre-
hensive analysis of the fifty states and the District of Columbia's use of
fault in the probate context. Part I surveys what behavior constitutes fault
and each state's variations on such definition. Part II reviews whether de-
fining fault in probate is a legislative or judicial function. After the "what"
and "who" aspects of fault are detailed, Part III considers the consequenc-
es of fault through a review of the particular probate benefits which may
be forfeited. Having provided this background, Parts IV and V compare
considerations of spousal misconduct in probate law to its use in workers'
compensation and dissolution law. Within each area of law reviewed, the
consideration of misconduct as a matter of fault or equity is contemplated.
Finally, Part VI raises the fault with using fault in probate. Drawing upon
the diminishing use of fault in dissolution, I first minimally argue for the
consistent treatment of fault in probate. I then advance more theoretical
justifications for the entire elimination of emotional fault in probate. To
do so, I rely upon the classic debate of English Lord Patrick Devlin and
American philosopher H.L.A. Hart on the legal enforcement of morality.
I charge that probate statutes which attempt to regulate marital behavior
i i For a discussion of the preclusion of bigamists in probate, see infra notes 26-33 and
accompanying text.
12 For a discussion of the use of spousal misconduct in workers' compensation law, see
infra Part IV.
13 For a comparison of the use of spousal misconduct in probate and dissolution law, see
infra notes io6-o7 and accompanying text.
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serve no legitimate state purpose. Without a "common understanding'
4
of marriage, the state cannot attempt to regulate marriage by enforcing a
code of moral behavior. This conclusion is drawn in proper deference to
the right of marital privacy. Recognizing every individual's right to define
his marriage during life and at death, I propose in Part VII the complete
elimination of emotional fault in probate.
I. WHAT IS FAULT?
A. Physical Fault: Murder
The definition of fault in probate covers a range of behaviors. Murdering
one's spouse is the most egregious behavior which results in estate preclu-
sion. Following the maxim that no man should profit from his wrongs,i
s
virtually all the states rely upon some version of a "slayer statute" or
14 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1953) (referring to congressional concep-
tions of marriage in the enactment of the War Brides Act).
15 Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 19o (N.Y. 1889) (first use of judicial equitable power to
deny the right to take property by will or intestacy in the case of a grandson who murdered his
grandfather). As later stated by Judge Cardozo in support of the Riggs decision:
There was the principle of the binding force of a will disposing of the
estate of a testator in conformity with law.... There was the principle
that civil courts may not add to the pains and penalties of crimes.... But
over against these was another principle, of greater generality, its roots
deeply fastened in universal sentiments of justice, the principle that no
man should profit from his own inequity or take advantage of his own
wrong.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 41 (1921).
16 Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have such statutes, although there
is terrific variation between them. For the state statutes, see AL. CODE § 43-8-253 (2005);
ALASKA STAT. § 13-12.803 (2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. §
28-11-204 (West 2005); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 250-258 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-
11-803 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-447 (West 2005); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, §
2322 (2005); D.C. CODE § 19-320 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 53-1-5 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-803 (LexisNexis 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 15-2-803 (2005); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6 (West 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12.1
(West 2005); IowA CODE ANN. § 633-535 (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (2004); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (West 2004); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 946 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 2-8o3 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-209 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.2803 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-803 (West 2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9I-
1-25 (West 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 461.054 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813 (2003);
NEa. REV. STAT. § 30-2354 (2004); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41 B (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
3B:7-5 to 7-7 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-803 (West 2005); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31A-3 to -12 (West 2005); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-10-03 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
84, § 231 (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.455 tO .555 (West 2003); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 88OI-8815 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-1.1-1 to 33-1.1-16 (2004); S.C. CODE
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judicial equity" to withhold inheritance rights from an individual who
kills an ancestor or benefactor. Yet despite the extreme reprehensibility
of murder, there is great variation in the states' treatment of killers. The
inheritance preclusion may extend only to particular relations such as a
spouse, or it may apply to any person regardless of whether he is a rela-
tive or simply a benefactor.'8 The statutes and common law may be writ-
ten to eliminate any combination of intestate privileges; gifts pursuant to a
will; and nonprobate transfers, such as life insurance and property held in
joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety.'9 They may apply only to acts of
voluntary manslaughter or to both voluntary and involuntary manslaugh-
ter.20 The necessity of a conviction is yet another distinction., When the
slayer is disinherited because of his action, there may also be variation as
to whether a descendant of the killer may claim "through or under" the
slayer.22 Attempting to rely strictly upon state statutes or case precedent
to address the myriad complicating details can result in severe injustice. 3
ANN. § 62-2-803 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-803 (2005);TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-io6
(West 2005); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(d) (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803 (West
2005);VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551(6) (2005);VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401 tO415 (West 2005);WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § I1.84.OIO to I 1.84.900 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (West 2005);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 852.oI(2m), 854.14 (West 2005); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101 (zo05).
I7 Two states rely solely on judicial equity to prevent killers from benefitting from their
victims' estates. These states are Massachusetts, see Slocum v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E.
816, 816 (Mass. 1923), and New Hampshire, see Kelley v. State, 196 A.zd 68, 69-70 (N.H.
1963).
States also rely upon judicial equity to compensate for shortcomings in their slayer statutes.
For a comprehensive discussion of each state's case law, see Michael G. Walsh, Annotation,
Homicide as Precluding Taking Under Will or by Intestacy, 25 A.L.R. 4th 787 (2004).
18 Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-1 1-204 (West 2o05) (forfeiture for murder of spouse),
withALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803 (2004) (forfeiture for murder of any individual).
19 Compare ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803 (2004) (revoking probate and nonprobate rights of
any individual), with N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney 2005) (disqualifying
joint tenant convicted of murder in the first or second degree of another joint tenant from
distribution of any monies held together in a joint bank account).
2o Alternatively, some states have drawn the distinction between murder and man-
slaughter. For discussion of the voluntary versus involuntary manslaughter and the murder
versus manslaughter distinction, see In re Estate of Mahoney, 22o A.zd 475 (Vt. 1966) (limiting
disinheritance to voluntary manslaughter); see also Walsh, supra note 17, § 6.
21 For discussion of the conviction requirement, see Walsh, supra note 17, §§ 5, 7.
22 For a recent review of this question by the states, see Cook v. Grierson, 845 A.2d
1231 (Md. 2004) (in the absence of an express statutory provision, relying on judicial equity
to disinherit the grandchildren of a decedent 'Who was killed by their father who had been
convicted of second-degree murder).
23 For further discussion of the numerous variations in slayer statutes and common law,
see generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 126-31 (7th ed. 2005);
Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 489 (1986);
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 803 (1993); Walsh,
supra note 17.
0o5-2oo6]
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For example, in Kansas the statutory conviction requirement resulted in an
award of a wife's estate to the estate of her murderer/husband because he
committed suicide immediately after killing her and consequently could
not be convicted of murder. 24
B. Emotional Fault
i. Bigamy.-Apart from the physical and brutal act of murder, "emotion-
al harms" to the decedent may also result in the forfeiture of inheritance
rights. Bigamy, adultery, abandonment, desertion, and nonsupport are the• 25
most common behaviors considered. Amongst such behaviors, bigamy is
26the most commonly agreed upon act which results in the loss of benefits.
However, unlike the other emotional harms, the preclusion for bigamy may
be a matter of equity rather than a matter of fault.
In probate proceedings, bigamy tends to arise in two types of cases. In
one instance, the decedent and the survivor are not legally married because
one of them (or both) without being divorced or widowed from an earlier
spouse has nevertheless remarried. If this situation arises, the surviving par-
ty is typically denied any inheritance rights because the marriage was void
ab initio, thereby preventing the survivor from being the legal spouse. 27 A
court may, however, disregard the lack of valid marriage and choose to treat
24 See United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 427 P.zd 67 (Kan. 1967), overruled in part by Harper v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 662 P.2d 1264 (Kan. 1983). Since that time, Kansas has amended its slayer
statute so that cases of murder-suicide are treated as instances of simultaneous death. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (2004). To prevent such inequitable results, other states explicitly encour-
age their slayer statutes to be broadly construed. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-414 (West 2005);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.84.900 (West 2004). For further discussion of the challenges posed
by subscribing either to a philosophy of legislative deference or judicial equity, see infra notes
60-63 and accompanying text.
25 For a discussion of the use of abandonment or desertion in probate, see infra notes
35, 49-53 and accompanying text. For a discussion of adultery, see infra notes 36, 41-43 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of nonsupport, see infra notes 37,47-48 and accompany-
ing text.
26 At least 40 states address bigamy, either by adopting a version of the Uniform Probate
Code section which disinherits bigamists, relying upon other statutory language, or by fol-
lowing case law. Such states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. For each state's particular statutory provision or case precedent, see infra notes
29-32 and accompanying text.
27 While pursuant to a state's family or domestic relations law the decedent and the
surviving party's marriage in this case is void ab initio, some states have chosen to explicitly
confirm the denial of inheritance benefits within their probate statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.z(a)(2) (McKinney 2005) (disqualifying an individual as a surviv-
ing spouse when the "marriage was void as ... bigamous.").
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the survivor as a spouse as a matter of equity if, for example, the surviving
spouse had no knowledge of the decedent's bigamy.
In the other case, the decedent and the survivor initially had a valid mar-
riage, but the surviving party has remarried prior to the decedent's death
without a valid divorce. In this instance, because the decedent and the sur-
viving party's marriage remains legally valid, the surviving party is arguably
entitled to benefits as she remains the decedent's legal spouse. However,
the vast majority of states prevent the surviving party from enjoying spou-
sal inheritance rights. At least eighteen states have adopted versions of the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which precludes individuals who remarry
after an invalid divorce is obtained by the decedent from inheriting.29 An
additional fourteen states disinherit bigamists either by reliance on stat-
utes that are explicitly directed at bigamists or have been interpreted to• 30
encompass bigamy. In another eight states, the courts deny inheritance
z8 Compare Titus v. Titus, 1o P.2d 872 (Kan. I94O) (first wife denied inheritance due to
failure to obtain a divorce; decedent's second wife who married in good faith takes as a mat-
ter of equity), with Childress v. Smith, 2oo N.E. 179 (Ill. 1936) (bigamy of decedent prevents
treatment of second spouse who later remarries as a surviving spouse).
29 Nine states have adopted the current version of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC),
which reads in relevant part: "a surviving spouse does not include.., an individual who, fol-
lowing an invalid decree or judgment of divorce or annulment obtained by the decedent, par-
ticipates in a marriage ceremony with a third individual." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-802(b)(2)
(revised 1993); see AtAsKA STAT. § 13.12.802 (2oo4); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2802 (2004);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15- ! 1-802 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-802 (2oo4); MD. CODE ANN.,
EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-202(C) (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-812 (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§45-2-802 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-02 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802
(West 2005); WIS. STAT. § 851.30 (West 2005).
Six states have adopted an earlier version of the Uniform Probate Code which omits
the phrase "an invalid" in the code section, but clarifies in the subsequent comment that
the divorce or annulment secured by the decedent was invalid. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-802
(amended 1975). See ALA. CODE § 43-8-252 (2005); CAL. PROB. CODE § 78(c) (West 2005); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 15-2-802(b) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I8-A, § 2-802 (2005); NED. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30-2353 (LexisNexis 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6z-z-802 (2004).
Two states have adopted a more modified version of the Uniform Probate Code language.
See MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 700.2801(2) (West 2005) (including amongst the preclusion pro-
visions that the remarriage may follow an "invalid decree or judgment of divorce" or that the
survivor "at the time of the decedent's death, is living in a bigamous relationship with another
individual"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-I-102(b)(2) (West zoo5) (noting that the survivor's remar-
riage can follow either a "valid or invalid" divorce decree).
30 Two states use language explicitly referring to individuals who knowingly commit
bigamy. See MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-2oz(d) (West 2004) (bigamy with conviction);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3 iA-I (a)(5) (West 2004) (surviving spouse "knowingly contracts a biga-
mous marriage"). Maryland also disqualifies individuals who remarry after an invalid divorce
is obtained by the decedent. See supra note 29.
Inheritance statutes prohibiting abandonment and adultery have also been relied upon
to preclude survivors who have committed bigamy. See, e.g., Warner v. Warner, 658 S.W.2d 81,
83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (relying upon Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.140, which addresses abandonment
and adultery as the basis for disinheriting a bigamist).
For states which may rely upon abandonment, adultery or general fault statutes to dis-
2005- 2006]
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rights to bigamists by relying upon their equitable powers.3' Perhaps not
surprisingly, the states which do not exclude bigamists when they have
maintained a legal marriage to the decedent are "no-fault" probate states
that do not provide any statutory basis for fault disinheritance.32
Preclusion for bigamy may seem to be a means of condemning fault.
However, disinheritance for bigamy may simply be an equitable decision.
The UPC preclusion well illustrates this distinction between fault and
equity. Pursuant to the UPC, a survivor who has remarried is denied in-
heritance rights even if his remarriage was in good faith reliance upon an
invalid divorce obtained by the decedent.33 Knowledge of wrongdoing is
irrelevant. What is relevant is that the surviving "spouse" has considered
inherit bigamists, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-436, 45a-320 (West 2004) (abandonment
terminating elective share and family allowance); IND. CODE ANN. §29-1-2-14; 29-1-2-15 (West
2004) (adultery and abandonment); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.090 (West 2004) (adultery); LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2433, 2437 (2004) (denying survivor's marital fourth and family allowance
if separation of the parties occurred without decedent's fault); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474-140 (West
2005) (abandonment and adultery); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56O:19 (2004) (survivor guilty
of conduct which is cause for divorce); N.J. STAT. ANN. §3B:8-I (West 2004) (loss of elective
share if "living separate and apart" or having "ceased to cohabit as man and wife"); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-I.2(a)(2) (McKinney zoo5) (abandonment); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2103.05 (West 2005) (adultery as a bar to dower); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 114.135 (West 2003)
(survivor "living apart" from decedent with court discretion to determine circumstances of
separation); zo PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2 106 (West 2005) (willful neglect, nonsupport or willful
and malicious desertion); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492 (2004) (loss of wrongful death benefits
for abandonment by either spouse or nonsupport by husband); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3
(West 2005) (desertion or abandonment).
31 See In re Estate of Golden, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 155 (1997) (no inheritance rights
when surviving spouse fraudulently represented self as divorced from decedent and remar-
ried); In re Estate of Montanez, 687 So. 2d 943 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (no inheritance rights
when surviving spouse fraudulently represented self as divorced from decedent and remar-
ried); Hamrick v. Bonner, 354 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (annulment of second marriage
not valid as motivated by desire to inherit from first marriage); Stevens v. Stevens, 136 N.E.
785 (II1. 1922) (surviving spouse denied inheritance as marriage not recognized when divorce
from earlier spouse obtained within two years before remarriage); Childress v. Smith, 2oo N.E.
179 (Ill. 1936) (bigamy of decedent and remarriage of second spouse prevents her treatment
as surviving spouse); Titus v. Titus, io P.2d 872 (Kan. 1940) (first wife who remarries without
obtaining divorce denied inheritance; decedent's second wife married in good faith takes as a
matter of equity); Parmelee v. Hutchins, 131 N.E. 443 (Mass. 1921) (wife's reliance on invalid
divorce through remarriage estopped her from claiming widow's allowance); Rowell v. Rowell,
170 So. 2d 267 (Miss. 1964) (bigamous marriage of survivor after marriage to decedent estops
inheritance from decedent's estate); In re Estate of Allen, 738 P.2d 142 (Okla. 1987) (surviving
party estopped from asserting a legal marriage to first spouse when divorce not pursued and
survivor's cohabitation with another could be construed as marriage).
32 Ten states and the District of Columbia have chosen not to preclude bigamists or
other brands of misbehaving survivors by statute or case law. These "no-fault" probate juris-
dictions are Arkansas, D.C., Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. For further discussion of the division between the
states in the use of emotional fault, see infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
33 For the states subscribing to the UPC, see supra note 29.
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herself to be and held herself out as the spouse of another. As a matter of
equity, rather than a matter of fault, such an individual is prevented from
claiming inheritance privileges from the decedent.
2. Abandonment, Adultery, Nonsupport, and Grounds for Divorce. - Disinher-
itance for other emotional harms may be more aptly characterized as fault-
based preclusion. In total, twenty-three states have some consideration of
emotional fault other than bigamy at probate. The most commonly recog-363533
nized are abandonment or desertion," adultery, and nonsupport." Other
34 The states which rely on emotional harms other than bigamy are Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. For each specific state's recognition of fault
in either its statutes or case law, see infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
35 At least fifteen states specifically consider abandonment or desertion, either as a mat-
ter of law or equity. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-436(g) (West 2005) (forfeiture of election
and intestacy rights); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-320 (West 2005) (forfeiture of family allow-
ance); HAw. REv. STAT. § 533-9 (2004) (loss of wife's dower right, although dower limited by §
533-1 repeal to accrual prior to 1977); IND. CODE. ANN. § 29-1-2-15 (West zoo5 ) (forfeiture by
abandoning spouse); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § I5, ch. 209 § 36 (West 2005) (forfeiture
of abandoning spouse's right to waive provisions of the decedent's will); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.28oi(2)(e) (West zoo5) (the term "surviving spouse" does not include those who
were "willfully absent from" or "deserted" the decedent); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West
2005) (abandoning spouse barred from all inheritance rights, allowances, and exemptions);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 56o:i8 (2004) (husbands who have "willingly abandoned...and ab-
sented" their wives are not entitled to a portion of her intestate estate); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRuSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a) (McKinney zoo5) (abandoning spouse not a surviving spouse); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31A-i (West 2005) (abandoning spouses lose all rights to intestate succes-
sion, allowances and elective shares); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2 io6(a) (West zoo5); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, §149z (2004) (wrongful death); VA. CODE ANN. § 64. i-16.3 (West 2oo5) (abandon-
ing spouse barred from "all interest in the estate" of the decedent); Kreisel v. Ingham, i 13 So.
zd 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (contemplating abandonment as basis for forfeiture); Tillman
v. Williams, 403 So. zd 88o (Miss. 1981) (desertion estops a surviving spouse from inheriting);
Swift v. Reasonover, 77 S.W.zd 8o9 (Tenn. 1935) (forfeiture of homestead); see also Miller v.
Miller, 158 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1959) (precluding elective share). For a general discussion of
the courts' legislative deference versus equitable reliance, see infra Part II.
36 In at least five states, the survivor's adultery can jeopardize probate rights. See IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-I4 (West 2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.090 (West 2004); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 474.140 (West 2oo5); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31A-I(2) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4123.59 (West 2005).
37 In at least five states, survivors may forfeit probate rights upon establishment of non-
support of the decedent. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.280i (West 2005); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 560:18 (2004); N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTs LAW § 5-1.2(a) (McKinney zoo5); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2 io6(a) (West 2005) (explicitly including both forfeiture for willful neglect
and nonsupport); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492 (2004) (wrongful death). However, because
abandonment may be based upon either actual or constructive abandonment, states denying
inheritance rights due to abandonment may also recognize nonsupport as a basis for preclu-
sion. For further discussion of the abandonment/nonsupport overlap, see infra note 50 and
accompanying text.
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states rely upon more general fault language within their probate statutes.
These states may directly cross reference their family or domestic rela-
tions statutes by mandating forfeiture for an offense which is recognized
by the state as grounds for divorce or separation. Finally, there are some
less common reasons for estate preclusion. However, these are also rooted
in traditional concepts of fault. For example, while adultery or desertion
would not prevent survivor benefits in Maryland, a conviction for bigamy
is sufficiently egregious to create a statutory bar.3 9 In a highly publicized Il-
linois case, a surviving husband's rights to his wife's estate were denied be-
cause the court suspected that the husband had encouraged his male lover
to kill his wife even though his lover had been acquitted of such crime.40
38 In at least three states, a survivor risks forfeiting probate rights if it is determined
that the decedent could have established grounds for divorce against the survivor. See LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2433 (2004) (forfeiture of marital fourth); id. art. 2437 (forfeiture of family
allowance); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560: 19 (2004) (forfeiture of all inheritance rights except as
provided for by decedent's will); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-i (West 2005) (loss of elective share);
see also In re Succession of LaBorde, 540 So. zd 966 (La. App. 1988).
Even without a legal separation, several states allow forfeiture upon showing that the
survivor bears some fault in the parties' separation. In Oregon, the courts are given discretion
to reduce the surviving spouse's elective share by any amount deemed appropriate when the
parties are living apart at the time of the decedent's death and the court takes into consider-
ation other circumstances, including the reason for the parties' separation. See OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 114.135 (West 2003). Similarly, in Louisiana, when the parties are separated, the survi-
vor is only entitled to the marital fourth and a periodic allowance "on proof that the separation
occurred without his fault." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2433 (2004) (forfeiting marital fourth); see
also LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2437 (2004) (forfeiting elective share).
In New Jersey, the probate statute's cross reference to the divorce statutes is not limited
to establishing the survivor's fault. If a cause of action for divorce can be established by the
survivor against the decedent, the survivor also tragically loses her elective share. Moreover,
since the decedent's death prevents a divorce action from being pursued by the survivor after
the decedent dies, divorce benefits are also not available, thus creating a legal "black hole"
for the survivor. Carr v. Carr, 576 A.zd 872, 874 (N.J. i99o) (surviving wife not entitled to elec-
tive share as decedent had willfully deserted her prior to death; as wife also not entitled after
decedent's death to pursue divorce action which had been filed before decedent's death, court
remands action for consideration of the imposition of a constructive trust); see also N.J. REV.
STAT. § 3B:8-1 (West 2005).
39 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-202(C) (West 2004); Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 46 A.2d
619, 619 (Md. 1946) (awarding adulterous spouse inheritance rights as statutory preclusion
only for bigamy convictions). Georgia has also denied benefits when a survivor remarried and
his motives appeared questionable. See Hamrick v. Bonner, 354 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
(denying benefits to a survivor who, after having a subsequent marriage annulled, continued
to cohabit with his second wife, thus raising suspicion that the annulment was financially
motivated).
40 See United Press International, Olds Barred from Late Wife's Money, Dec. 15, 1995;
Darryl Van Duch, He Wishedfor Death of Wife, Court Told, NAT'L L.J., Jan. i, i996, at A5; Darryl
Van Duch, Suspicions Prove Costly, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 1996, at A6. The court's preclusion may
plausibly be a broad interpretation of Illinois' slayer statute. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
6 (West 2005) ("A person who intentionally and unjustifiably causes the death of another shall
not receive any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of the death.").
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C. Interpreting Emotional Fault
1. Construction Challenges.-Variations in the types of emotional fault rec-
ognized by the states are compounded by numerous interpretive differenc-
es. Amongst the states which deny inheritance rights to adulterers, there is
some basic agreement. In order to prove adultery, there is general reliance
upon a preponderance standard and, given the nature of the misconduct,
a willingness to rely entirely upon circumstantial evidence.4' Each state's
statute also includes language which requires the survivor to be "living in
adultery.'"4 2 Yet despite such literal and evidentiary similarities, states do
not consistently require physical residence with the paramour.43
Disinheritance by reliance on divorce or separation grounds also results
in interpretive differences. 44 Such statutes may be seen as a simple short-
hand measure used to create consistency between divorce and probate
fault grounds. However, because a state's grounds for divorce can include
both traditional fault grounds and more contemporary no-fault standards,
questions arise as to whether a spouse forfeits his inheritance share when
the no-fault dissolution standard of "irreconcilable differences" is estab-S 45
lished. Disinheritance may also be statutorily mandated when parties are• 46
physically separated but the marriage remains legally intact.
41 See, e.g., Oliver v. Estate of Oliver, 554 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 9o); In r Estate
of Trogdon, 409 S.E.2d 897, 900 (N.C. 1991).
42 See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-14 (West 2005) ("If either a husband or wife shall have
left the other and shall be living at the time of his or her death in adultery... "); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 392.090(2) (West 2004) ("If either spouse voluntarily leaves the other and lives in adul-
tery... "); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 2005) ("If any married person voluntarily leaves his
or her spouse and goes away and continues with an adulterer.., or dwells with another in a
state of adultery... "); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31 A-i (2) (West 2005) ("A spouse who voluntarily
separates from the other spouse and lives in adultery... "); Onso REV. CODE ANN. § 2103.05
(West 2005) ("A husband or wife who leaves the other and dwells in adultery... ").
43 See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 156 S.W. 413,414 (Ky. 1913) (adultery alone, without physi-
cally leaving the spouse, is sufficient); In re Estate of Montgomery, 528 S.E.2d 618, 62I (N.C.
2000) ("living in adultery" means more than a single act of "committing adultery," but less
than "residing" in adultery).
44 For the states' use of divorce grounds in probate, see supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
45 See, e.g., In re Hitchcock, 391 A.zd 882,883 (N.H. 1978) (interpreting New Hampshire's
forfeiture statute, which disinherits a surviving spouse when "such survivor was or had been
guilty of conduct which constitutes cause for divorce," as only applicable when a fault based
ground for divorce can be established despite the "irreconcilable differences" statutory basis
for divorce).
46 In New Jersey a surviving spouse only maintains his elective share:
provided that at the time of death the decedent and the surviving spouse
had not been living separate and apart in different habitations or had not
ceased to cohabit as man and wife, either as the result of judgment of
divorce from bed and board or under circumstances which would have
given rise to a cause of action for divorce or nullity of marriage to a dece-
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2. Application Differences.-In addition to statutory construction differ-
ences, there may be little consensus in applying the fault standards. Dis-
agreement may exist as to what factually constitutes nonsupport or "willful
neglect.' 47 If a survivor refuses the help of others and provides his spouse
with sub-par living conditions, is he guilty of willful neglect even if he is•1 . . 48
"an irascible, irritable, choleric old man" with mental infirmities?
Likewise, it is difficult to agree as to what behavior constitutes aban-
donment.49 States which recognize abandonment as a basis for forfeiture
list some common criteria: i) an act of departure, 2) the intention not to
return, and 3) no cause for or consent to the departure. 5° Forfeiture is be-
lieved justified in such cases as "[a spouse] can not repudiate, while her
husband lives, all the obligations of the marital relations, and take all the
benefits which remain after he dies."' However, what is necessary to meet
the abandonment standard? Compelling facts are often deemed insuffi-
dent prior to his death under the laws of this State.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-t (West 2005).
Relying upon this statutory provision, a surviving spouse who was separated from her
husband because of his desertion could not receive probate benefits from his estate. Because
her husband died before the divorce she had filed was finalized, she was also statutorily ineli-
gible to receive an equitable division of marital property at divorce. See Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d
872, 877(N.J. 199o). Given the devastating statutory consequences, the New Jersey Supreme
Court remanded the case, instructing the lower court to rely upon the equitable notion of a
constructive trust in order to award property to the widow. See id. at 88o. For further discussion
of Carr and the problems raised by more open-ended fault statutes in probate, see infra note
167 and accompanying text.
47 For the states precluding spousal inheritance for nonsupport of the decedent, see
supra note 37. For recognition of the overlap between nonsupport and "constructive" aban-
donment, see infra note 5o.
48 In re Estate of Fonos, 698 A.zd 74, 78-80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (finding insufficient
evidence to establish willful neglect or refusal to support).
49 For the states which preclude spousal inheritance for abandonment of the decedent,
see supra note 35.
50 See, e.g., Estate of Calcurt v. Calcutt, 576 N.E.2d 1288, 1294 (Ind. Ct. App. 199i);
Fellabaum v. Alvarez, 67 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949); In r Jellech, 854 S.W.2d 828,
830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); In re Estate of Lapenna, z26 N.Y.S.2d 497,499-500 (N.Y. App. Div.
1962); In re Estate of Lorenzo, 6o2 P.zd 521, 528 (Haw. 1979). Abandonment and nonsupport
claims may overlap to the extent states recognize both actual and constructive abandonment.
See, e.g., Meares v. Jernigan, 530 S.E.2d 883, 885-86 (N.C. Ct. App. zooo) (considering a claim
of constructive abandonment consisting of both affirmative acts of cruelty and willful failure
to provide support).
Si Heil v. Shriner's Hosp. for Crippled Children, 365 S.W.2d 736,742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963)
(quoting Wilson v. Craig, 75 S.W 419, 432 (Mo. 1903)).
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cient.5 2 Matters are further complicated if the decedent is argued to have
acted less than virtuously or condoned the survivor's behavior.1
3
II. WHO DECIDES: A MATTER OF LAW OR EQUITY?
Apart from definitional differences, states also vary in understanding fault
as a matter within legislative or judicial control. For harms other than mur-
der or bigamy, eighteen states disinherit a surviving spouse by statute.4
Absent any legislative direction, an additional five states rely upon their eq-
uitable powers to estop a surviving spouse from claiming inheritance rights
when there has been misconduct.5" The courts have also taken liberties in
52 See, e.g., In re Estate of Chambers, 257 N.Y.S.zd 685,688 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (despite
ten year separation, abandonment standard not met, as no showing that departure was unjus-
tified and without decedent's consent); Estate of Fonos, 698 A.zd at 80 (insufficient evidence
to meet forfeiture standard despite surviving husband being "an irascible, irritable, choleric
old man" with mental infirmities who provided sub-par living conditions); Mears, 530 S.E.2d
at 885-86 (no evidence of intent to constructively abandon or willfully desert where both
decedent and husband were very old and feeble, despite decedent's severely deteriorating
condition during final days living with husband and being found covered with food and feces
and "very nearly comatose"); In re Estate of Riefberg, 446 N.E.zd 424, 425-26 (N.Y. 1983)
(insufficient showing of abandonment despite couple living apart and surviving wife's request
that locks be changed and husband be excluded).
53 See, e.g., In re Crater's Estate, 93 A.zd 475, 477-78 (Pa. 1953) (surviving wife's adultery
after husband leaves her constitutes desertion as she is now in "open disregard of her marital
obligations" and insufficient evidence that his departure was without cause); In re Estate of
Mancuso, 722 N.Y.S.zd 651, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. zoos) (despite three year separation, failure
to prove forfeiture of elective share under theory of abandonment or nonsupport where de-
cedent asked surviving spouse to leave residence and insufficient proof survivor was able to
support decedent); In re Mooney's Will, 86 N.Y.S.zd 485, 486-87 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1948) (aban-
donment defeated by subsequent condonation through separation agreement).
Such problems significantly contributed to the elimination of fault in divorce. For further
discussion of the analogy between fault-based probate and dissolution standards, see infra
Part V.
54 The states which disinherit by statute are Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia. For such states'
statutory disinheritance provisions, see supra notes 35-38.
This article does not consider murder or bigamy at this point. As murder is the most
extreme physical harm, it raises little controversy regarding the decision to preclude spousal
privileges. Likewise, bigamy is excluded from this discussion of fault, since as previously
stated, it raises a more equitable rationale than the other emotional fault behaviors. For a dis-
cussion of the slayer statutes, see supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of bigamy, see supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
55 See Kreisel v. Ingham, I13 So. 2d 205,207-210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (contemplating
abandonment as basis for forfeiture); Hamrick v. Bonner, 354 S.E.zd 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
(precluding surviving spouse from inheriting when the annulment of his second marriage
believed to be financially motivated); Tillman v. Williams, 403 So. 2d 88o, 881 (Miss. 1981)
(recognizing absent statutory direction that "clear abandonment or desertion" may estop a
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defining what constitutes fault. While adultery or even a subsequent biga-
mous marriage might not "ipso facto" preclude a surviving spouse, a court
may deny inheritance rights when the survivor's misconduct is of a "fla-
grant and inexcusable character." s6 "Philandering," 7 abandoning a "blind
and helpless" spouse, ss and conspiring to kill one's spouse s9 are amongst
the behaviors that probate courts have found sufficiently egregious.
Such equitable decisions are significant as descent and distribution
is commonly recognized to be a legislative matter. Without deference to
the legislature, courts risk usurping the legislature's role in setting public
policy, "making next of kin avengers of marital wrongs."6 Legislative con-
trol over probate matters is so absolute that the Supreme Court has found
that statutory limitations on a decedent's "right" 6' to distribute his property
upon death may only amount to an unconstitutional taking when there has
been a "complete abolition" of both descent and devise without any gov-
ernment purpose being served .
Strict statutory construction has led to seemingly harsh results such as
allowing a surviving spouse to claim an elective share of her husband's es-
surviving spouse from claiming his elective share); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 16 So. 2d 23 (Miss.
1943) (consideration of fault in award of family allowance); Swift v. Reasonover, 77 S.W.2d 809,
8o9-Io (1935) (forfeiture of homestead); Duch, Suspicions Prove Costly, supra note 40 (prohibit-
ing an Illinois husband believed to have encouraged his wife's killing from inheriting).
56 Nedd v. Starry, 143 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (denying a "philanderer"
an intestate share in his deceased spouse's estate when the couple had only cohabitated for
one year after a formal marriage and the husband engaged in two subsequent ceremonial mar-
riages in two different states and commonly engaged in sexual relations with other women).
57 Id. at 524.
58 Swift, 77 S.W.2d at 8o9 (denying homestead rights but awarding dower to a surviving
spouse who abandoned her "blind and helpless" husband fourteen months after they were
married).
59 See Duch, Suspicions Prove Costly, supra note 40.
6o Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 46A.2d 619, 621 (Md. 1946) (awarding surviving spouse inheri-
tance rights to decedent's estate despite survivor's adultery). Regardless of whether probate is
recognized as a legislative or judicial matter, this article ultimately questions the propriety of
either branch's reliance upon emotional fault in probate. For the arguments against the use of
fault in probate, see infra Part VI.
61 While this article refers to the decedent's and surviving spouse's respective "rights"
to pass and inherit property throughout this article, the legal distinction between "rights" and
"privileges" places matters of descent and distribution clearly on the side of "privilege." "The
right to receive property by devise or descent is not a natural right but a privilege granted by
the state ... A State may deny the privilege altogether or may impose whatever restrictions or
conditions upon the grant it deems appropriate." Hall v. Vallandingham, 54o A.zd 1162, 1164
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (relying on Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490 (1850)). However,
as it is also acknowledged that the "rights" versus "privilege" distinction has largely eroded,
this article uses the terms rights and privilege. For discussion of the rights/privilege distinc-
tion, see William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HA v. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
62 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987).
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tate based on the statutes in place at the time of her spouse's death even
though the decedent's will (which had left virtually his entire estate to his
son) was executed at a time when the law still denied elective shares for
abandonment and the decedent had been so abandoned.63 "The Legisla-
ture giveth, and the Legislature taketh away."
64
63 After abandoning her husband, the couple remained legally married for approximate-
ly nine more years. The will was executed shortly after the wife abandoned her husband
when dower rights were forfeited by abandonment. Approximately nine months before the
decedent's death, when the husband was "legally blind and in poor health," the legislature
abolished dower and replaced it with the right of election which had no consideration of fault.
See In re Petition of Shiflett, 490 S.E.2d 902, 904-06 (W. Va. 1997).
For other instances where absent explicit statutory provision, abandonment, or other mis-
conduct has not barred inheritance, see Mabry v. Mabry, 535 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Ark. 1976)
("[Nieither spouse, individually or in collusion with the other, may effectively nullify, sus-
pend or interrupt the binding force of their marriage contract by mere abandonment, and such
abandonment does not end the marital status."); Pogue v. Pogue, 434 So. 2d 262, 264 (Ala.
1983) ("The great weight of authority is against any finding of an 'implied exception' to the
descent and distribution statutes.... In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the
fact a surviving spouse abandoned the deceased spouse does not bar the surviving spouse's
right to inherit under descent and distribution." (internal citation omitted)); Schmeizl, 46 A.2d
at 620 ("It has long been established at common law that, in the absence of statutory provi-
sion to the contrary, a widow will not be barred from her right of inheritance in her husband's
estate, even though she has deserted him and lived in adultery."); United Trust Co. v. Pyke,
427 P.2d 67, 74 (Kan. 1967) (allowing a wife's estate to be awarded to her husband's estate
after the husband killed his wife and then committed suicide because the existing forfeiture
statute required a conviction), overruled on other grounds by Harper v. Prudential Ins. Co., 662
P.ad 1264 (Kan. 1983); In re Torres' Estate, 120 P.2d 816, 817-18 (Nev. 1942) (husband who
abandoned his wife remained entitled to his intestate share of her separate property because
legislature failed to incorporate any consideration of fault in the award of separate property, al-
though abandonment, by statute, resulted in forfeiture of community property rights); Wooten
v. Carmichael, 267 S.W. 344, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (husband's total abandonment of wife,
leaving her destitute did not limit his intestate share as statute "unequivocally" fails to con-
sider fault).
These cases are used as examples of the terrific deference the legislature is generally
shown in probate law. However, to the extent such cases do not consider emotional harm as a
matter of equity when the legislature has made no such provision, the cases also support the
proposition that such harms should not be considered in probate either by the legislative or
judicial branch. For the arguments in favor of the elimination of emotional harm in probate,
see infra Part VI.
64 Hall, 540 A.2d at 1i65.
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III. How FAULT IS APPLIED: THE FORFEITURE
OF INHERITANCE
A. The Benefits Forfeited
When fault is taken into account in estate distribution, the monetary ben-
efits subject to loss may also vary.6' The potential rights at stake are those
that cannot or have not been restricted by the decedent's will.66 A survivor's
intestate rights, which arise when the decedent has no will or has not de-
vised all or part of his property pursuant to a valid will,67 as well as a survi-
vor's alternative right to take any type of elective, dower or "forced" share
against any will the decedent has properly executed, 68 are perhaps the two
most significant rights. However, a survivor's homestead claim to the family
residence, her right to a "family" or "widow's" allowance during the course
of probate proceedings, and her right to take possession of exempt property
of a personal nature are amongst other important benefits. 6
Eleven states legislate that all monetary benefits are lost when fault is
found.70 In six states, only the right of election or dower interest is specifi-
65 A spouse may also lose nonfinancial privileges, such as being named administrator of
the estate, because of misconduct. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31A-i(b)(5) (West 2005).
66 This includes both probate and nonprobate rights. For purposes of illustration, this
discussion is limited to the loss of more critical financial rights. For an overview of all of the
potential probate and nonprobate rights of a surviving spouse which do not depend upon a
decedent's will, see DUKEMINIER El" AL., supra note 23, at 30-31 (distinction between probate
and nonprobate), 59-73 (spousal intestate rights), 126-32 (bars to spousal intestate rights),
32I-44 (discussion of nonprobate transfers), 417-65 (restrictions on the decedent's power to
dispose through probate).
67 A spouse's intestate share varies by state and is often dependent upon whether the
widow and/or the decedent have children who may benefit directly from their own intestate
rights or benefit indirectly from those of the survivor. For further discussion of the variations
in intestate statutes, see id. at 59-73, 126-32.
68 The elective share typically ranges from allowing the widow to take one third to one
half of the decedent's estate, despite the existence of a valid will in which the decedent may
attempt to completely preclude his widow from taking any portion of his estate. With the
exception of Georgia, all the separate property states and the District of Columbia provide
for an elective share. Because of efforts to prevent a survivor's election by placing one's estate
in nonprobate assets, many states have also moved toward including a decedent's nonpro-
bate assets amongst those subject to election. For a discussion of the wealth of diverse issues
and complications associated with the elective share, see id. at 425-55. The traditional dower
interest of a life estate has generally been replaced by the notion of elective share. Several
states, however, still rely upon the term dower and preclude such rights because of fault.
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 533-9 (2004) (desertion as a bar to dower); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2103.05 (West 2005) (adultery as a bar to dower). For a comparison of the traditional dower
interest and elective share, see LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW I 11-12
(2d ed. 2000).
69 For a discussion of such rights, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 421-22.
70 It should be remembered that the states not only vary in the size of such benefits but
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cally eliminated," although such elimination is accompanied by the loss
of family allowance in two of these six states.72 By statute, one state uses
fault only to eliminate wrongful death benefits.73 In other states, courts rely
upon their equitable powers to eliminate certain rights. One state court has
eliminated intestate rights,74 while another has limited the use of fault in
probate to forfeiting homestead claims.75 Another state court has simply
denied the family allowance.
6
B. Explaining the Distinctions
These differences may not reflect arbitrary choices by the states but rather
disagreement as to the purpose of the relevant benefits and what effect, if
any, a survivor's misconduct should have upon these benefits. Perhaps the
greatest number of states have singled out the elective share for forfeiture
when the survivor has engaged in misconduct because the elective share
supports the decedent's effort to preclude or restrict his spouse's testamen-
tary share.77 The forfeiture of homestead rights may also seem justified.
also as to which benefits are even available. The states eliminating all benefits are Connecticut,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. For the states' particular authority, see supra notes 35-38.
71 These states are Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon.
For such states' relevant authority, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
72 These states are Louisiana and Mississippi. For such states' relevant authority, see
supra notes 35, 38 and accompanying text.
73 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492 (2004). Other states determine the apportionment
of wrongful death benefits in a variety of ways. They include the utilization of the intestate
scheme, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28A-i8-2(a) (West 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-40
(2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.OI-53 (West 2oo5), determination of actual loss suffered by interest-
ed individuals, see, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-102 (2005); Parrish v. Jones, 722 P.2d 878 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986), and consideration of other equitable factors, see, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-6
(West 2005) (allowing consideration by jury of actual loss and other equitable factors). Such
methods potentially allow for the indirect consideration of fault to the extent the fact finder is
entitled to factor fault into a determination of actual loss or an equity analysis.
74 See Nedd v. Starry, 143 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (denying a "philan-
derer" an intestate share).
75 See Swift v. Reasonover, 77 S.W.zd 8o9, 809 (1935) ("[W]ife's wrongful abandonment
of the husband is an abandonment of the homestead..."). In other jurisdictions, the loss of
homestead may occur without any consideration of whether the marital abandonment was
wrong. For example, in Wisconsin, a spouse yielded her homestead interest when she left
the property intending to seek divorce and thereby could not demonstrate the "certain and
abiding intention to return." Schapiro v. Security Savings & Loan Ass'n, 441 N.W.zd 241, 244
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
76 See Hamrick v. Bonner, 354 S.E.2d 687, 687 (1987) (precluding surviving spouse from
inheriting when the annulment of his second marriage was believed to be financially moti-
vated).
77 As previously stated, seventeen states eliminate the elective share when fault is found.
Eleven states eliminate all probate rights, and an additional six eliminate only the elective
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As its name suggests, homestead rights exist "mainly to protect the family
in the possession of a home as a fixed abode.' Consequently, homestead
claims may arguably be lost upon abandonment of the marriage because
such abandonment possibly obviates the need for a "family" home.79 Alter-
natively, a state may view the rights in a hierarchical fashion thereby disal-
lowing rights perceived as less significant while steadfastly protecting other
more critical provisions. For example, in Mississippi, while abandonment
or desertion eliminates a survivor's family allowance and may in some8i
instances result in the loss of elective share, greater misconduct such as
entry into a bigamous marriage is necessary before intestate rights may be
forfeited8 2
Despite the many internal inconsistencies within probate law between
the states as to what specific acts constitute fault, who defines it, and how
benefits are restricted, such variations may seem defensible. The endless
distinctions and uses of fault by the states may be an administrative head-
ache assumed as a matter of state prerogative. Each state that endorses
any use of fault may also justify its policy as an effort to prevent monies
from falling into unclean hands. However, these arguments are weakened
when some practical and theoretical observations are made about the use
of fault in probate. At first blush, it seems reasonable to assume that a state
share upon a finding of fault. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (noting states' use
of fault to forfeit the elective share).
While honoring the decedent's effort to preclude his spouse may at first glance justify the
forfeiture of an elective share, such justification is not consistent with the traditional under-
standing that an elective share is meant to parallel at death the notion of equitable distribu-
tion used to divide property at divorce. For further discussion of the need to adhere to the
traditional purpose of the elective share, see infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
78 Swift, 77 S.W.zd at 81o; see also Overstreet v. Sircy, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3137,
s o- i i (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on Swift).
79 Swift, 77 S.W.2d at 81o (protecting a survivor's right to dower but denying her home-
stead claim on account of her misconduct and "wrongful" abandonment of her husband). By
comparison, other states may deny homestead privileges if a spouse abandons the marriage
without any consideration of the wrongfulness of such behavior. See, e.g., Schapiro, 441 N.W.2d
at 244.
80 See Byars v. Gholson, 112 So. 578, 578-79 (Miss. 1927) (no allowance awarded to sur-
viving wife who was living apart from husband without his fault and not supported by him); cf
Vaughan v. Vaughan, 16 So. 2d 23 (Miss. 1943) (family allowance preserved because decedent,
not survivor, at fault for survivor leaving decedent and decedent remarried without divorcing
survivor).
81 "[Tihe statute has to be strictly construed unless there is a clear desertion and aban-
donment that sets up the estoppel." Tillman v. Williams, 403 So. zd 88o, 881 (Miss. 1981)
(reversing a denial of elective share).
8z Rowell v. Rowell, 170 So. 2d 267, 272 (Miss. 1964) (denying estoppel of spouse's in-
testate rights despite survivor's adultery in the absence of a commission of bigamy or a statute
precluding inheritance due to adultery).
83 For further discussion of the unclean hands justification, see supra note 15 and accom-
panying text (discussing such consideration in the context of murdering one's benefactor).
[Vol. 94
NO-FAULT DEATH
would consider spousal misconduct in cases involving workers' compen-
sation death benefits and dissolution of marriage to the extent it makes
similar conduct considerations in probate. Without such consistency, it may
appear difficult for a state to argue that it truly believes such behavior is
reprehensible. However, before charging that such weaknesses exist within
any state's law, one must consider whether the inconsistencies between the
various areas of law can be explained bt distinguishing between the use
of conduct as a matter of equity or fault. Yet even when a state is consis-
tent in its use of conduct as a punitive measure, more theoretical concerns
need to be addressed. The legal enforcement of a moral code must be war-
ranted.
8 5
IV. WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND SPOUSAL MISCONDUCT
A. The Use of Misconduct
Spousal behavior is still considered by a significant number of states in dis-
tributing workers' compensation death benefits to a surviving spouse when
the working spouse has died and his employer is accountable.- In twenty-
one states, a surviving spouse's misconduct prior to the decedent's death
bars the survivor from claiming workers' compensation death benefits.8 '
Similarly, in the District of Columbia and ten other states, a misbehav-
ing surviving spouse's claim is presumptively denied, although evidence of
dependence on the decedent preceding his death overcomes the wrongdo-
84 A similar distinction is drawn between state considerations of bigamy and other emo-
tional harms (such as adultery, abandonment, desertion or nonsupport) in the probate context.
See supra notes 24-4o and accompanying text.
85 For the discussion of the ineffective enforcement of morality through probate, see
infra notes 153-6o and accompanying text.
86 For comprehensive treatment of spousal death benefits, see 5 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX
K. LARSON, LARSON's WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 98-I to 98-26 (2005).
87 In nine states, fault simply creates a bar to survivor benefits. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
440.o2(18) (West 2005); 8zo ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/7 (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
508(C)(2) (2005); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-680 (West zoo5); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAw
§ 16(i-a) (McKinney 2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 656.005 (West 2003); 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 562 (West 2005); lhx. LAB. CODE § 408.182 (Vernon 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-13 (West
2005); see also Midway Landfill, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 304 N.E.2d 607 (I11. 2003) (recognizing
misconduct as a possible bar to benefits).
In twelve states, fault rebuts a presumption of dependency. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-61
(2005); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-io64 (2005); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-41-501 (West 2005);
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-13 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.42 (West 2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 342.075 (West 2005); MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 32 (West 2004); MICH. Comp. LAws
ANN. § 418.331 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.111 (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4123.59 (West 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-210 (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-515
(West 2005).
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ing. Of the remaining nineteen states which do not consider misconduct,
fifteen still require a showing of dependence upon the decedent.89 Only
four states adhere to a standard in which the survivor bears no burden other
than demonstrating a legal marriage. 90
Like probate law, the primary conduct considered in workers' compen-
sation death benefit cases is abandonment. 9' Each of the thirty-two states
that consider misconduct in workers' compensation relies upon some notion
92
of abandonment. Two states also consider whether the surviving spouse
is cohabitating in a "meretricious relationship," while two others also con-
sider more general misconduct in the allocation of workers' compensation
death benefits.93 Yet, despite the facially comparable misconduct terms in
88 See ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.395(33) (2oo4); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 233o(d) (2005); D.C.
CODE § 32-1501 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-410 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 102
(2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-3 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 97-2 (West 2005); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3.1 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-13 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42- 1-
175 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-4-2I (2005).
89 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102 (West 2005); CAL LAB. CODE § 3501 (West 2005); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-275 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-1 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-
3-19 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 23:1255 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116 (2003);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-124(2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:z (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-
13 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-17 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02 (2003);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-40 3 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.08.020 (West 2005);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.51 (West 2005); see also Woman's Home Companion Reading Club v.
Indus. Comm'n, 285 N.W. 745, 746 (Wis. 1939) (defining statutory requirement of "living with
spouse" to preclude only legal or actual estrangement).
90 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616C.5o5(13) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 I, § 634(2004);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-1oz(a)(xvii) (2005); Snowbarger v. MFA Cent. Coop., 317 S.W.zd 390
(Mo. 1958).
91 In the thirty-two states which consider spousal fault in workers' compensation cas-
es, misconduct is characterized solely through one or more of these terms. These states are
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. For reference to each state's par-
ticular workers' compensation statute, see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
By comparison, abandonment is specifically used by fifteen states in probate. For use of
abandonment in probate codes and case law, see supra notes 35, 49-52 and accompanying
text.
To the extent states rely upon more general fault language in probate, such states also
contemplate abandonment. For use of abandonment and general fault by the states and the
relevant authority of each state in probate, see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
92 Included within this standard of abandonment are states which rely upon such statu-
tory language as whether the surviving spouse "voluntarily abandoned," "willfully deserted,"
was "voluntarily living apart," or was "living apart without justifiable cause." For reference to
each state's particular workers' compensation statute, see supra notes 87-90 and accompany-
ing text.
93 The four states which rely upon fault considerations in addition to abandonment are
Georgia, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and West Virginia. Georgia and Pennsylvania find the pre-
sumption of dependency rebutted by cohabitation in a "meretricious relationship." See GA.
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probate and workers' compensation, the standard is not consistently used
within each state.
B. The Inconsistency of Probate and Workers' Compensation
Of the thirty-two states relying upon spousal misconduct to make awards in
workers' compensation death benefits cases, seventeen do not consistently
consider misconduct as a basis for disinheriting surviving spouses. 94 Con-
versely, of the twenty-three states that rely upon fault in probate proceed-
ings, eight do not consider conduct in determining a surviving spouse's
right to workers' compensation death benefits. 9s
As a general matter, rights of probate and workers' compensation are
created by statute and fully controlled by the legislature.9 The misalign-
CODE ANN. § 34-9-13 (West 2004); 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 562 (West 2004). While Illinois
makes no statutory reference to fault, its case law recognizes more general "misconduct" as a
possible bar. See Midway Landfill, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 304 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. 1973). In West
Virginia, in addition to a surviving spouse being denied benefits for her abandonment of the
decedent, she can also be denied benefits if she was abandoned for "a reason that would have
entitled the deceased employee to an annulment or divorce.... "W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-13
(West zoo3).
94 The seventeen which consider fault in workers' compensation death claims but not
in probate proceedings are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, D.C., Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
and West Virginia. For the relevant probate authority, see supra notes 34-38 and accompany-
ing text. For the relevant workers' compensation authority, see supra notes 87-90 and accom-
panying text. See also Appendix.
Because forfeiture for bigamy in probate is ultimately based on an equitable rationale, the
treatment of bigamy is not included in the comparison of probate and workers' compensation
use of fault. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
This article does not discuss the loss of inheritance for murder within the comparison to
workers' compensation, because there is no parallel in workers' compensation. By definition,
it is the employer, not the spouse, who is responsible for the decedent's death in workers'
compensation cases involving death benefits.
95 The eight states which consider fault at probate but rely upon a no-fault standard
to award workers' compensation death benefits are Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Vermont. However, in six of these states, the
survivor must still evidence dependence on the decedent to receive workers' compensation
benefits. Of the eight, only Missouri and Vermont award workers' compensation death ben-
efits without any consideration of fault or dependence.
The fifteen states which consider fault in both workers' compensation and probate
proceedings are Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia.
For the relevant probate authority, see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. For the
relevant workers' compensation authority, see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. See
also Appendix.
96 For recognition of the legislative control over inheritance, see supra Part II. For rec-
ognition of the legislative control over workers' compensation, see A.O. Smith Corp. v. Indus.
Comm'n., 485 N.E.2d 335, 337-38 (Ill. 1985); City of McKeesport v. Workers' Comp. Appeal
Bd., 746 A.2d 87, 89 (Pa. 2000).
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ment between workers' compensation and probate may thus be simply
seen as the product of haphazard legislative thinking. However, the differ-
ences may be better understood by recognizing that workers' compensa-
tion death benefits and probate privileges serve different functions. With
varying legal purposes, the use of misconduct in each context can under-
standably also vary.
C. Fault versus Equity and the Case for Inconsistency
Inheritance by will or intestacy is a right belonging to the decedent to
which the beneficiaries have no vested claim.97 The legislative interest in
protecting the decedent at probate explains the use of fault therein. It is
a posthumous legislative second guessing game-would a decedent truly
want to leave his estate to a surviving spouse who engaged in adultery or
abandoned him? When the legislature or the court acts upon the widow's
fault in probate, it believes it is acting on behalf of the decedent and pre-
cludes the surviving spouse from benefitting from the individual he has
betrayed.
98
By contrast, workers' compensation death benefits are considered to
belong to the survivor and are not merely a privilege derived from the de-
cedent's rights. 99 Unlike probate, the foremost legislative interest in award-
ing workers' compensation death benefits is the well being of the surviving
spouse. The division of workers' compensation death benefits changes the
critical question to one of dependence-did the surviving spouse finan-
cially depend upon the decedent? As a result of this focus, the almost ex-
clusive use of an abandonment standard to restrict workers' compensation
death benefits of surviving spouses is not an effort to redress fault.,3" It
is rather a means of determining dependency. Consequently, despite the
use in workers' compensation of misconduct terms similar to those used
in probate, statutes that preclude the surviving spouse's death benefits in
workers' compensation are not driven by a fault agenda.
97 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1987) (recognizing the standing of dece-
dent's potential heirs and devisees as third parties protecting the decedent's right of inheri-
tance rather than resulting from a claimed violation of their own rights and interests).
98 For discussion of the use of fault in probate, see supra Part I.
99 See, e.g., Mizell v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 315 S.E.2d 123, 124 (S.C. 1984); Rouse
v. WCC, 342 S.E.2d 229, 231 (W. Va. 1986). For recognition of this principle by the courts of
various states, see LARSON & LARSON, supra note 86, § 98.o1 (recognizing the general purpose
of workers' compensation death benefits).
oo As previously discussed, of the thirty-two states which deny workers' compensation
benefits for misconduct, twenty-eight rely exclusively upon abandonment, desertion, or "vol-
untarily living apart." The other four states allow other considerations in addition to abandon-
ment. See supra notes 87-9o and accompanying text.
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V. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE AND SPOUSAL MISCONDUCT
A. The Use of Misconduct
Spousal misconduct may also appear in three critical provisions of a state's
dissolution statutes. Pursuant to a 2004 survey by the Family Law Quarterly,
while each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia now include
some no-fault ground within their grounds for dissolution of marriage, thir-
ty-two states also maintain some traditional fault grounds such as desertion
or adultery.'° ' Marital misconduct of the emotional nature may also be a
negative factor in alimony and property determinations.0 2 The American
Law Institute (A.L.I.) reports that thirty states consider emotional fault in
alimony determinations. 0 3 A.L.I. also reports that eighteen states continue
iO In Family Law Quarterly's annual chart reviewing the states' "Grounds for Divorce
and Residency Requirements," the thirty-two states categorized as "No Fault Added to
Traditional" fault grounds are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. In addition to the "No FaultAdded toTraditional" fault
ground, the chart also categorizes by "No Fault Sole Ground," "Incompatibility," "Living
Separate and Apart," and "Judicial Separation." Charts, 37 FAM. L.Q. 577, 58o (2oo4).
1o2 Economic misconduct can also be considered at divorce. Economic misconduct
encompasses such behavior as the wasteful dissipation of assets and reckless incurrence of
debts. It is therefore distinct from emotional misconduct such as adultery or abandonment, as
such behaviors may have little or no direct economic consequences. Not surprisingly, there is
greater agreement between the jurisdictions regarding the relevance of economic misconduct.
Unlike emotional fault, consideration of economic misconduct in dissolution may be a direct
effort to compensate for financial damage. Therefore, economic misconduct is not considered
in the comparison of the use of fault in different legal contexts. For further discussion of
the distinction between economic and emotional misconduct and the legitimacy of economic
considerations, see Charts, supra note 1O, at 577, 58o (noting in Charts I and 4 each state's
use of marital fault and economic misconduct in alimony and property determinations); Ira
Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 776-77 (1996)
(noting that all states consider economic misconduct but vary in use of noneconomic mis-
conduct); HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 68, at 509; HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 81o-iz (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the legitimacy of eco-
nomic misconduct and noneconomic misconduct considerations at divorce); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse & Katharine T. Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-
Fault Era, 82 GEo. L.J. 2525, 2528-29 (1994) (distinguishing between and comparing the
different types of fault).
1'O3 According to the American Law Institute's Principles ofthe Law of Family Dissolution,
the thirty states which consider emotional fault in alimony determinations are Alabama,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 44 nn.
66-68 (2002) [hereinafter A.L.I.]. This study of fault is based upon a 1996 survey prepared
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• • 04to consider emotional fault in marital property distributions. Yet, in com-
paring each state's use of emotional fault in determining the parties' eco-
nomics at divorce with the use of fault in distributing a decedent's estate at
probate, there is no consistent pattern.'o
5
by A.L.I.'s Chief Reporter, Ira Mark Ellman. Id. at 44 n. 66. In 1996, Professor Ellman pub-
lished a detailed review of every state's treatment of fault in alimony and property determina-
tions. Professor Ellman divided the states into five categories: "Complete No-Fault, Property
and Alimony," "No-Fault Property, Limited Fault Alimony," "Almost Complete No-Fault,
Property and Alimony," "No-Fault Property, Full Fault Alimony," and "Full-Fault, Property
and Alimony." Ellman, supra note 102, at 780-8 I. His comprehensive analysis includes appen-
dices which reference each state's relevant statutes and case law. The District of Columbia is
not surveyed. A.L.I.'s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution essentially reproduces Ellman's
1996 article. See A.L.I., supra note 103, at 45-46; Ellman, supra note 102, at 778-82, 81o-3o.
Family Law Quarterly annually publishes similar charts on the use of fault in alimony
determinations. A chart entitled "Alimony/Spousal Support Factors," divides the states
for alimony into the two categories of "Marital Fault Not Considered" and "Marital Fault
Relevant." According to Family Law Quarterly, twenty-seven states consider fault in alimony
determinations. Charts, supra note io , at 577.
On the treatment of fault in alimony determinations, Family Law Quarterly editors and
Professor Ellman differ in minor respects on their characterization of only five states-
Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Ohio, and Vermont. Family Law Quarterly classifies Arkansas as
"Marital Fault Not Considered," while Ellman includes it amongst the states that are "Almost
Complete No-Fault" and indicates that Arkansas case law has allowed the use of fault only
in egregious cases. Family Law Quarterly classifies Florida as "Marital Fault Relevant," while
Ellman includes it amongst the "Complete No-Fault" states. Ellman recognizes fault as listed
amongst Florida's statutory factors but reports that case law limits the statute to fault car-
rying financial consequences. Family Law Quarterly classifies Kansas as "Marital Fault Not
Considered." Ellman characterizes it as "Almost Complete No-Fault Property and Alimony"
but states that case law dicta only indicates consideration for extreme cases. Family Law
Quarterly classifies Ohio as "Marital Fault Not Considered." Ellman includes it amongst "No-
Fault Property, Limited Fault Alimony," indicating the statute allows for consideration of "all
relevant factors." Family Law Quarterly classifies Vermont as "Marital Fault Not Considered."
Ellman includes Vermont in the group of "Full-Fault, Property and Alimony" but indicates
that despite the absence of statutory instruction, court discretion might allow for consider-
ation of fault in alimony determinations. See Charts, supra note 1o, at 577; Ellman, supra note
102, at 778-82,8IO-3o.
104 These eighteen states are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming. The District
of Columbia was not included in this review. A.L.I., supra note 103, at 44 nn. 66-68; see also
Ellman, supra note 102, at 781-82, 81o-3o. A.L.I. notes that no state allows for fault consid-
erations in property, while following a no-fault policy for alimony. Conversely, seven states
do allow for fault considerations in alimony, while not engaging in such considerations in
property distributions. A.L.I., supra note 103, at 43-49; Ellman, supra note 102, at 782. Seealso
Appendix. Perhaps because of such overlap, Family Law Quarterly, which annually reviews the
use of fault in alimony determinations, carries no similar analysis for property distribution at
divorce. Charts, supra note ioi.
1o5 Because the focus is on the use of fault in allocating assets at divorce and at death,
the use of fault as a ground for divorce is not included in this comparison of fault's role in dis-
solution and probate.
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B. The Inconsistency of Probate and Dissolution
A state is as likely to subscribe to a fault standard in one proceeding and
a no-fault standard in the other as it is to consistently pursue a fault or
no-fault standard in both proceedings. Only one-half of the states consis-
tently follow a fault or no-fault standard in both probate and dissolution. Of
the twenty-three states that consider emotional fault in probate, only ten
consistently consider fault in alimony and property determinations at di-io6
vorce. Of the twenty-seven remaining states which do not consider fault
in probate, fifteen consistently do not consider fault in either alimony or
property determinations at divorce.'°7
C. Fault versus No-Fault and the Case for Consistency
Unlike workers' compensation law, the use of fault in divorce proceed-
ings is an important consideration when evaluating the use of fault in pro-
bate. Probate and dissolution proceedings both make distributions of as-
sets earned during the course of the marriage. Moreover, the rationale for
relying upon fault in probate is analogous to its traditional justification in
io6 The ten which consider fault in probate and in both alimony and property determi-
nations are Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont.
Of the remaining thirteen states which consider fault in probate but do not consistently
consider fault in both alimony and property determinations at divorce, five rely upon fault
in probate but do not consider fault in either alimony or property determinations at divorce.
These states are Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, and Oregon. The remaining eight states
rely upon fault in probate and recognize fault in alimony determinations but not in property
determinations. These states are Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia. In many of these states, fault may also be a ground
for divorce. For each state's relevant authority, see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text
(regarding probate), 103-04 and accompanying text (regarding alimony and property determi-
nations at divorce). See also Appendix.
107 The fifteen consistently "no-fault" states which do not consider fault in probate or
in alimony or property determinations at divorce are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Of the remaining twelve states which do not consider fault in
probate, eight consider fault in both alimony and property determinations at divorce. These
states are Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and
Wyoming. The final four states which do not consider fault in probate continue to consider
fault in alimony but not in property determinations at divorce are Idaho, South Dakota, Utah,
and West Virginia. Many of these states also continue to consider fault as a ground for divorce.
For each state's relevant authority, see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (regarding
probate), 103-04 and accompany text (regarding alimony and property determinations at di-
vorce). See also Appendix.
io8 For the equity/fault distinction between workers' compensation and probate law in
their respective uses of misconduct, see supra notes 97-1oo and accompanying text.
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divorce. '°9 In each context, the elimination or restriction of a misbehaving
spouse's monetary rights is intended to be punitive."0
Given the common motive, a state should consistently follow either
a fault or no-fault standard in both proceedings. Certainly, a state could
achieve consistency between its probate and divorce law by arbitrarily
adopting either a fault or no-fault standard. Fortunately, the determination
to pursue either a fault or no-fault standard can be more sensible. In the
divorce context, there has been a dramatic elimination of fault as a ground
for divorce as well as a factor in alimony and property over the last thirty-
five years."' This "trend" toward no-fault in dissolution has not been with-
out controversy.". 2 However, despite such resistance in the divorce context,
probate standards should also move toward the elimination of fault. The
arguments in favor of disregarding fault at divorce are analogous and often
more powerful when raised in the probate context.
D. The Development Of No-Fault Divorce
The elimination of fault in the divorce context began with the recognition
of its ineffectiveness as a ground for divorce. Limited to fault grounds such
1o9 See, e.g., In re Jac Estate, 49 A.zd 360, 363 (Pa. 1946) (recognizing the standard of
fault for desertion necessary to terminate inheritance rights analogous to fault standard in
divorce).
I o At divorce, fault's use has traditionally been recognized as a punitive and compensa-
tory measure. However, after the distinction between economic and emotional misconduct
is made, the compensatory justification for emotional fault may simply serve as a guise to
punish otherwise unactionable, nontortious conduct. If a court is unable to determine which
party "'caused"' the divorce, the fault determination ultimately turns on "the parties' relative
moral failings, not the relationship between independent and dependent variables." A.L.I.,
supra note 103, at 51. For more direct recognition and support of fault's moral function in
dissolution, see generally Margaret E Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869 (1994) (supporting ongoing use of fault in order to enforce the marital
contract); Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility
in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 605 (1996) (supporting some ongoing use of fault in
divorce proceedings); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Tranformation of American
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 18o3 (1985) (describing the trend of moral values diminution in
family law); Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, I991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1991) (arguing against morally neutral alimony standards); Peter Nash
Swisher, The A.L.L Principles: A Farewell to Fault-But What Remedy for the Egregious Marital
Misconduct of an Abusive Spouse?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & Pot.v 213, 22o (arguing for the use of
fault as "moral issues still do matter in a family law context"); Woodhouse & Bartlett, supra
note io2 (recognizing the value of fault in divorce law).
For the use of fault as a punitive measure in probate, see supra Part I.
I I I In 1970, California was the first state to adopt a no-fault ground for divorce. For
discussion of the history of no-fault's adoption by the states, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 440-42 (2002).
112 For discussion of the controversy regarding the use of fault in dissolution, see infra
notes 128-3 1 and accompanying text.
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as adultery, abandonment, or extreme cruelty, parties wanting to terminate
their marriage often needed to engage in collusion or perjury to satisfy the
court that their relationship had become untenable because one party had
engaged in such misconduct. This interest in avoiding system abuse co-
incided with a growing recognition that the terms of marriage were not to
be dictatedby the state. Rather than viewing marriage as a public institu-
tion, it became recognized as a private right.
' 4
If, as the Supreme Court emphasized, marriage was "not an indepen-
dent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup," then
every individual was guaranteed the right to enter as well as exit marriage
"free from unwarranted governmental intrusion."' 5 The recognition of
marriage as a unique relation, each one defined (however imperfectly) by
the two wed individuals, significantly contributed to the development of
no-fault divorce standards. , Individual privacy not only discouraged the
courts from inquiring into the delicate and sordid details of failed relation-
ships but also made such titillating facts irrelevant. Without a "common
understanding""' of marriage, how could there be a common understand-
ing of fault? Use of fault in any aspect of divorce came under suspicion. As
the fault grounds of divorce became replaced or supplemented by the no-
fault divorce ground of "irreconcilable differences," the use of marital mis-
conduct in dividing property and determining alimony also diminished.""
Today, the majority of states now adhere to no-fault divorce standards." '9
Such standards are also uniformly promoted by the Uniform Marriage and
113 Such defenses as recrimination, connivance and condonation which existed in a
fault-based divorce system also prevented divorce or encouraged system abuse. For a general
discussion of the demise of fault-based divorce, see FRIEDMAN, supra note I I I, at 434-42;
MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 63-1I1 (1987); HARRIS &
TEITELBAUM, supra note 68, at 319-42.
114 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (recognizing the decision to
marry as among the personal decisions protected by the constitutional right of privacy).
115 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (addressing the constitutional right of
privacy within the "marital relationship").
116 As A.L.I. recognizes, "the imposition of external standards on an intimate relation-
ship may risk inappropriate, and possibly even unconstitutional, intrusion on marital privacy."
A.L.I., supra note 103, at 60 (relying upon Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.zd 391, 400 (Tex. App.
i991) (rejecting the use of external standards in tort claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress)).
117 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 6I I (1953) (discussing Congress' "common
understanding" of marriage).
.18 See supra notes io0-1O4 and accompanying text (noting A.L.I.'s and Family Law
Quarterly's surveys on the use of fault by the states as a grounds for divorce and in alimony and
property determinations). See also Appendix.
I 9 For a review of the adoption of no-fault, see supra notes 101-04 and accompanying
text. See also Appendix.
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Divorce Act (UMDA) and the American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution. 20
VI. THE FAULT WITH FAULT
A. Applying The Lessons Of Fault Divorce To Probate
Arguments against the use of fault in probate follow from the justifications
for no-fault divorce. Even assuming that a surviving spouse's adultery or de-
sertion can be conclusively established, extensive inquiry into the couple's
marriage challenges both the survivor's and the decedent's privacy. ' The
decedent's failure to have terminated the relationship or have affirmatively
limited the inheritance of the misbehaving spouse also suggests his toler-
ance of a behavior which, while perhaps not complying with a "traditional"
understanding of marriage, should be respected in order to recognize his
right to set the terms of his relationship. 22 Additionally, even at divorce in
a fault-based divorce state, the injured spouse personally decides whether
to introduce his injury into evidence and can thereby control the invasion
into his privacy. In probate, the court or estate administrator necessarily
introduce the matter posthumously without any assurance the decedent
would have assented to the exposure of his intimate marital details. Un-
like divorce proceedings, in probate proceedings the injured party (i.e., the
decedent) cannot testify as to the harm inflicted by his spouse's behavior.
What may be egregious harm in one relationship may be accepted or at
least forgiven behavior in another.' Absolute standards that only take into
120 In the UMDA sections for property distribution and spousal maintenance, there is
explicit language which mandates that determinations be made "without regard to marital
misconduct." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 307 (property distribution), 308 (spousal
maintenance) (amended 1973). The UMDA also supports only no-fault grounds for dissolu-
tion or legal separation. See at § 302.
A.L.I. supports a no-fault principle in both alimony and property distributions in order to
improve "consistency and predictability" while maintaining the "core tenet" that dissolution
law should only compensate for financial losses. A.L.I., supra note IO3, at 43. The American
Law Institute's no-fault stance is consistent with the view it took as early as 1955 with its
publication of a draft Model Penal Code, which supported decriminalizing all private sexual
relations between consenting adults. For a discussion of these developments in the Model
Penal Code, see HART, supra note 3, at 15.
121 For a discussion of the difficulty in defining emotional fault in probate proceedings,
see supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
122 This of course assumes that the decedent was aware of the infidelity or misconduct.
If the decedent was unaware, the argument in favor of no-fault may be more difficult to make,
but it is still necessary in order to maintain a consistent standard and prevent delving into the
private details of marriage.
123 As acknowledged by one court in critiquing the use of fault in divorce, the "bounds
of decency" may vary. Massey v. Massey, 807 S.Wzd 391, 400 (Tex. App. i9 I). The American
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account the surviving spouse's misconduct may also be unfair, as they fail
to examine any possible misconduct by the decedent that may have pre-
cipitated the surviving spouse's behavior.' 4
Like divorce, the use of fault in probate can be arbitrary.'2' Inheritance
rights may be summarily denied to a legally "at fault" surviving spouse who
may not have inflicted any injury in fact upon the decedent.'2 As was well-
stated in one probate matter, "[hiuman relations between spouses are so
complex and influenced by so many circumstances, separations occur in
so many instances with fault and without fault, with consent and without
consent."'27
B. Applying the Lessons of No-Fault Divorce to Probate
As in the divorce context, the concerns regarding no-fault need to be con-
sidered in advocating such a standard at probate. Initially, the elimina-
tion of fault in divorce was charged as contributing to the feminization of
poverty. Husbands were reported to disproportionately benefit from the
no-fault release from payment due to their misdeeds. This charge was
Law Institute's recommendation that fault be removed from divorce determinations of alimo-
ny and property was also made in recognition of the difficulty in measuring the harm caused
by fault-defined conduct. A.L.I., supra note 103, at 50.
124 For a comparison of absolute versus relative evaluations of fault in probate law, see
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
In the divorce setting, the recognition that fault may be shared has also contributed to
academic and judicial efforts to eliminate its consideration. See, e.g., A.L.I., supra note 103, at
5 '; see also Chalmers v. Chalmers, 320 A.2d 478,482 (N.J. 1974) (dismissing the use of fault in
alimony determinations as "merely a manifestation of a sick marriage").
125 As warned by the American Law Institute regarding the ongoing use of fault in di-
vorce, "[miuch mischief can result from allowing courts to assign liability to nontortious con-
duct by application of unarticulated-and effectively unreviewable-standards of blamewor-
thiness." A.L.I., supra note 103, at 51.
126 In choosing not to consider abandonment by the surviving spouse as a matter of
equity, at least one court has recognized the difficulty in determining whether any harm was
truly inflicted. In so doing, it distinguished the clear damage done by the physical harm of
murder which could bar inheritance.
[Tlhe case of murder is far different from the case before us. [The sur-
viving spouse's] conduct, reprehensible though it may have been, was
not hidden from her husband. He could have debarred her from inherit-
ing any part of his estate, if he had so desired. For many years he had
ground for an absolute divorce, but he did not see fit to procure a divorce
for reasons unknown to us. Whatever his reasons may have been, the
inference to be drawn from his conduct is that he did not want to sever
the relation of husband and wife. However that may be, the fact remains
that he did not sever the relation.
Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 46 A.2d 619, 622 (Md. 1946).
127 In re Estate of Maiden, 31 N.E.2d 889, 89o (N.Y. 1940).
1z8 Lenore Weitzman's work was critical to the feminist claim that no-fault divorce
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largely statistically discounted and dismissed by less paternalistic brands offe "" 129
feminism. Recent increases in the number and pay of working women
have further mitigated the force of such arguments.1 30 Consequently, such
feminist criticisms of fault in divorce should have little bearing upon the
adoption of a no-fault probate standard. Yet a second concern-that no-
fault divorce contributes to the disintegration of moral values-raises more
basic and deeper questions.3 As in the development of no-fault divorce,
questions regarding the legal enforcement of morality must be addressed
in the promotion of no-fault probate.
C. The Legal Enforcement of Morality in Probate: Hart-Devlin Redux
In the classic debate between the English Lord Patrick Devlin and the
American philosopher H.L.A. Hart on the law's relevance to matters of
"private morality," Lord Devlin presented a traditional utilitarian justifica-
tion for the legal regulation of such private matters as the sexual practices
of consenting adults.'32 Like his liberal counterparts, Lord Devlin believed
was prejudicial to women. Her 1981 article's critique of no-fault was later repeated in her
1985 book. See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Lenore
J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and
Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. I (81 981). For a review and critique of Weitzman's
work and others raising similar gender-based attacks against no-fault, see IRA MARK ELLMAN
ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 368-72,438-40 (3d ed. 1998). For further feminist
support of fault in divorce, see June R. Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of
Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1464-67 (i990).
129 ELLMAN, supra note 1 28, at 371-72,438-4 o. For more liberal strands of feminism, see
Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265, 1266-1267 (1993) (review-
ing FEMINIST LEGAL TEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991)) (arguing that social equality can be best achieved for women by a return
to liberalism); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes:An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, Io i
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001) (embracing woman's sexuality and critiquing radical and cultural
feminism's characterization of female sexuality as either a means of oppression or reproduc-
tion).
130 See Louis Uchitelle, Gaining Ground on the Wage Front, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at
CI.
131 For the moralist support of fault in divorce, see Brinig & Crafton, supra note I o;
Morse, supra note I Io; Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family
Law, supra note I I o; Schneider, Rethinking Alimony, supra note I o; Swisher, supra note i jo.
132 The impetus for Devlin and Hart's debate was the report of the "Wolfenden
Committee" which was appointed in 1954 in England to study matters of morality and the
criminal law. In 1957, the committee recommended to the English legislature that homo-
sexual practices between two consenting adults be decriminalized and prostitution remain
criminal only to the extent it involved public solicitation. As the committee believed, "[tihere
must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms,
not the law's business." HART, supra note 3, at I4-15 (quoting the Wolfenden Committee's
Report). For Lord Devlin's acknowledgment of the influence of the Wolfenden Report on his
writings on criminal law, see DEVLIN, supra note 2, at v-x.
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that a shared "public morality" restricted every citizen's freedom to the
extent the state prohibited the physical injury of one citizen by another
in criminalizing such acts as murder and burglary.'3 3 Yet Lord Devlin also
supported enforcing a common "private morality" in order to prevent more' 34
intangible injuries to society. While doubting that many moral truths on
private matters existed, Lord Devlin posited that every society shared a
certain "community of ideas" which reflected, amongst other things, its
morality regarding acceptable personal behavior and relations. '3 Taking
no position on the integrity of such common attitudes, these private mor-
als needed to be publicly enforced in order to maintain social cohesion. 136
Without the observance of a common morality, a society was likely to "dis-
integrate from within." 37 However, emphasizing the maintenance of social
cohesion over the promotion of any particular morality, Devlin acknowl-
133 Devlin agreed with such liberals as John Stuart Mill and H.L.A. Hart on the enforce-
ment of laws intended to prevent the physical harm of others. However, Devlin believed that
the law should be further used to protect social morals. For Devlin's discussion of the liberal
position and criticism of Mill and Hart, see DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 102-23.
John Stuart Mill's On Liberty represents the most traditional liberal position that govern-
ment's interference with individual liberty should be limited to preventing one man from
physically harming another. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 141-42 (Pelican Books 1974)
(1859):
As soon as any part of a person's conduct affect prejudicially the inter-
ests of others, society has jurisdiction over it.... But there is no room
for entertaining any such questions when a person's conduct affects the
interests of no person besides himself.... In all such cases, there should
be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the con-
sequences.
Seealso DEVLIN,supra note 2, at 103. Hart presents a more modified liberal position, allow-
ing the law to prevent an individual from physically harming others as well as himself. HART,
supra note 3, at 33-34.
134 DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 17-18; see also ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL:
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 68-69 (1993) (interpreting Devlin's support for crimi-
nalizing matters of private morality as based upon a desire to prevent more intangible injury
to society).
135 DEVLIN, SUpra note 2, at 9.
136
If men and women try to create a society in which there is no fundamen-
tal agreement about good and evil they will fail; if, having based it on
common agreement, the agreement goes, the society will disintegrate.
For society is not something that is kept together physically; it is held
by the invisible bonds of common thought. If the bonds were too far
relaxed the members would drift apart. A common morality is part of
the bondage. The bondage is part of the price of society; and mankind,
which needs society, must pay its price.
Id. at 1o.
137 Id. at 13.
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edged, "[wihat is important is not the quality of the creed but the strength
of the belief in it.'
3
Even accepting the general validity of Devlin's disintegration thesis,
one may still question whether probate law should distribute based upon
moral determinations of a surviving spouse's worthiness. To warrant re-
stricting one's freedom, there must be a sufficient degree of "intolerance,
indignation, and disgust" toward a particular behavior. 3 9 Such a "strength
of belief" regarding what constitutes impermissible spousal misconduct
does not exist. 4 0 Only twenty-three states deny inheritance benefits due to
misconduct,' 4' and even among such states, only ten consistently consider
fault as a basis for limiting property and monetary determinations at di-
vorce. 4 The lack of consistency on questions of fault between probate and
dissolution law indicates there is little "strength of belief" as to whether
such misbehavior should be the basis for denying benefits. Indeed, if there
is any relevant common belief recognized in our law, it is that marriage
is an increasingly independent, individual right over which the state has
diminishing control. We recognize this individual freedom through such' 43
changes as the adoption of no-fault divorce laws, the legitimacy of pre-
marital contracts,' 44 the married woman's unilateral control over abortion• 5 146 .7
decisions, and the end of interspousal tort immunity. Without a strong
social consensus as to the significance of fault, states cannot rely upon a
utilitarian argument of social cohesion to support their legal efforts to en-
force morality.
138 Id. at 114.
139 Id. at 17.
140 Id. at 114.
141 See supra notes 34-4o and accompanying text; see also Appendix.
142 See supra note i o6 and accompanying text; see also Appendix.
143 See supra notes I 13-2o and accompanying text (discussing the development of no-
fault divorce laws).
144 On the use of premarital contracts, see generally Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow
of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 145 (1998) (discussing the evolution of premarital contracts); James Herbie
Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 950 (2ooo) (discussing the use of premari-
tal contracts as a means to "undo the excesses" of no-fault divorce); Katharine B. Silbaugh,
Marriage Contracts andthe Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 65 (1998) (considering the selec-
tive enforcement of only monetary provisions of premarital contracts).
145 See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976) (strik-
ing down state legislation requiring a married woman to gain her husband's consent before
proceeding with an abortion); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
887-98 (I992) (striking down state legislation requiring a married woman to inform her hus-
band of plans to have an abortion).
146 See HARRis & "ITELBAUM, supra note 68, at 139-47 (reviewing the demise of inter-
spousal tort immunity). Exceptions for interspousal crimes such as rape have also been largely
eliminated. Id. at 116-23.
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Alternatively, one could argue that the states that consistently con-
sider fault in probate and dissolution demonstrate the requisite level of
"indignation, intolerance, and disgust"' 47 to warrant its ongoing use. One
could also posit that we do share a strong belief against engaging in certain
types of spousal misconduct, but it is simply not reflected in our existing
law.14 However, in accepting either of these arguments, other questions
must be answered in order to justify the legal enforcement of morality.
Such questions were raised by H.L.A. Hart in response to Lord Devlin's
promotion of the legal enforcement of morality. As Hart observes, no soci-
'49ety has self-destructed because of differences in private morals. Such an
empirical observation might be made in comparing states which rely upon
fault in probate and dissolution with states that do not consider fault. As
Hart might query, are states which do not legislate morals on the brink of
destruction while states which do enforce morality are secure? One might
counter that Devlin's disintegration fear is to be interpreted less literally,
emphasizing the more intangible loss of social cohesion which results when
society members "drift apart" because their common morality has disap-
peared.'50 However, following Hart, reliance on the social cohesion justi-
fication to support the legal enforcement of morals in probate inevitably
leads to a more basic question. Does probate law effectively promote any
commonly held morality?' 5 ' Ultimately, this is the most fundamental ques-
tion. Regardless of whether a morality is supported because of its instru-
mental or its intrinsic value, the effectiveness of legal enforcement must
be evaluated.1
2
D. The Effectiveness of Moral Enforcement
i. Deterrence. -The effectiveness of punishment is measured in large de-
gree by considering the deterrent and retributive values.'53 As a matter of
deterrence, punishing the offender is deemed to prevent his continued en-
gagement in the unwanted behavior as well as coerce the desired behav-
147 DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 17.
148 Devlin acknowledges that prior to considering whether or not morality may be le-
gally enforced, it must be determined that a morality is socially shared. See id. at 7-8.
149 See HART, supra note 3, at 50-52.
150 See GEORGE, supra note 134, at 63 (citing DEVLIN, supra note 2, at io).
151 Cf. HART, supra note 3, at 57-58 (discussing coercion as rationale for the enforcement
of morality in criminal prohibitions).
152 Seeid. at 54.
153 See id. at 55-6o. Hart also acknowledges denunciation as a reason for punishment
which is related to retribution. Id. at 6o-69. While rehabilitation may also be a basis for punish-
ment, it has little application to probate as there is no need to correct the surviving spouse's
offensive ways when the decedent is not at threat of further injury after his death.
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' 54ior from others who want to avoid punishment. In the probate context,
correcting the offender's conduct is a moot issue-with the passing of the
decedent spouse, the widow can no longer engage in spousal misconduct as
there is no spouse to harm. Alternatively, one might hope that probate fault
laws discourage other potentially wayward spouses from committing the
wrong. A spouse who expects to be the principal beneficiary of her spouse's
will may be influenced by the knowledge that the spouse she harms may
affirmatively disinherit her. Yet it seems unlikely that a state's intestacy
statutes would provide any further disincentive. As a default measure re-
lied upon only when a will is nonexistent or inapplicable, intestacy statutes
seem too remote to influence behavior.
Statutes that deny an elective share due to misconduct arguably sur-
vive such a challenge to the deterrent value of spousal misconduct intes-
tacy statutes. Eliminating one's right to an elective share may be seen as
complementing the injured spouse's effort to exclude the at fault/misbe-
having spouse from his will. However, the traditional common law purpose
of the elective share is to recognize the "economic partnership theory of
marriage" and thereby imitate in probate the "equitable distribution" sys-_. 155
tem used to divide property at divorce. Moreover, nine out of seventeen
states that deny an elective share for fault do not rely upon fault in dis-
tributing property upon divorce. ,6 Consequently, in these states it seems
particularly inconsistent to justify the prohibition of an elective share for
fault because of a belief in its deterrent value while not relying upon fault
to diminish one's share when property is divided upon divorce.
2. Retribution. - If there is little deterrent value, fault-based probate stat-
utes may alternatively be justified as a means of retribution. In short, the
denial of inheritance is the "pain" inflicted upon the guilty spouse as "the
appropriate or 'fitting' return for moral evil done."'-7 The exacting of such
injury upon the surviving spouse presupposes that the decedent spouse
154 See id. at 55-69.
155 UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II pt. 2 gen. cmt. (amended 1993). Because the community
property state recognizes joint ownership of property during marriage, the elective share is
not necessary as the surviving spouse in a community property state simply remains the sole
owner. For further discussion of the parallels between equitable distribution and the elective
share, see HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 68, at io6-i 5 .
156 The nine states which eliminate the right of election for fault but do not rely upon
fault in property distribution are Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The eight states which consistently rely upon fault
to deny election and disproportionately divide marital assets are Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, and New York. For further
discussion of fault's effect on election, see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. For
further discussion of the states' use of fault in property distribution, see supra note 104 and
accompanying text; see also Appendix.
157 HART, supra note 3, at 59.
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was indeed injured by the legally condemned behavior. However, in the
no-fault divorce context, states already ignore any "injury" inflicted by
spousal misconduct. Consequently, if a state does not recognize fault in
divorce, how can it assume that a decedent spouse was so injured that it
must act in a retributive manner, denying benefits to a surviving spouse?'
In states that do continue to recognize fault in both dissolution and pro-
bate proceedings, it also remains difficult to recognize fault in probate. 5 9 As
recognized earlier in the comparison of fault's use in probate and divorce,
without testimony from the decedent as to the harm inflicted and an evi-
dentiary opportunity to evaluate the possible relative fault of both parties,
a retribution figure can not fairly be calculated. There is also no assurance
that the decedent spouse would want the marital misconduct publicly liti-
gated or that he even felt injured by such behawor.
By denying benefits to surviving spouses who have engaged in certain
proscribed conduct, a state unilaterally pronounces a single, inflexible defi-
nition of marriage and fault. To prevent inheritance benefits from being
denied, married couples are required to conform to this standard regard-
less of how misguided or ill conceived it may be. There is little, if any,
retributive or deterrent value. More importantly, it is unclear that there is a
shared definition of acceptable marital behavior that society wants legally
enforced.
E. The Privacy of Marriage at Death
Marriage is encompassed by the right of privacy. The elimination of
spousal misconduct considerations in probate furthers the recognition of
marriage as an individual right. However, ending the use of emotional
harm does not excuse misconduct. Instead, it recognizes that the law can-
not teach morality by demanding conformity. 62 Without fault in probate,
spouses who personally believe there has been a moral transgression must
158 Currently, thirteen states do not consistently consider fault in both alimony and
property determinations in divorce, while allowing such considerations in probate. See supra
notes IO6-07 and accompanying text. For additional arguments that states not contemplating
fault in dissolution proceedings should not consider it in probate, see supra notes io8-I 2 and
accompanying text (recognizing the need for consistency), 153-56 and accompanying text
(questioning the deterrent value of fault in probate); see also Appendix.
159 For a discussion of the states' use of fault in probate and divorce, see supra notes
10 1- 12 and accompanying text.
i6o For a comparison of fault's use in probate and divorce and the exacerbation of con-
cerns regarding party fairness and evidentiary problems in the probate context, see supra
notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
161 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,384 (1978).
162 "Much morality is certainly taught and sustained without [legal punishment], and
where morality is taught with it, there is the standing danger that fear of punishment may
remain the sole motive for conformity." HART, supra note 3, at 58.
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secure a divorce or separation. In so doing, an individual clearly signals
his intentions regarding property rights. By initiating a divorce or separa-
tion action, property is of course subject to equitable distribution. Yet
by clearly severing the relationship, spousal intestacy rights, like all other
marital benefits and obligations, are terminated.'6
VII. REPLACING FAULT IN PROBATE: THE LEGAL
MEASURE NECESSARY
A. Divorce or Legal Separation
While it may seem unduly harsh to impose the duty of securing divorce
or legal separation upon an aggrieved party, it must be remembered that
spousal intestacy rights and other inheritance privileges in twenty-seven
states and the District of Columbia already rely solely upon this simple
determination, which is supported by the UPC. Requiring a legal ter-
mination of marriage or separation is the only nonintrusive measure that
163 For an overview of the equitable distribution of property at divorce, see ELLMAN ET
AL., supra note 128, at 277-89, 293-97; HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 68, at 447-6o; KRAUSE,
supra note io2, at 751-53.
164 In most states, divorce also eliminates a spouse's rights pursuant to a will, making it
unnecessary to draft a subsequent will which does not include the former spouse. For discus-
sion of the effect of divorce upon a will, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 269-70.
165 For a discussion of the use of fault in probate by twenty-three states, see supra notes
34-40 and accompanying text. See also Appendix.
Pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code, an individual is not considered a "surviving
spouse" when there is a divorce or annulment, but makes clear that "[a] decree of separation
that does not terminate the status of husband and wife" is not a divorce. UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-802 (amended 1993). The Comment accompanying the section further details that the
expectation of a "definitive legal act" which will bar the surviving spouse in the case of a legal
separation necessitates "a complete property settlement." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-802 cmt.
(amended 1993). At least eighteen states have adopted a version of the UPC requiring a legal
separation explicitly terminating the status of husband and wife or, at a minimum, property
rights in order to terminate inheritance rights. SeeALA. CODE § 43-8-252 (2OO5); ALASKA STAT. §
13.12.802 (2004); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2802 (2005); CAL. PROB. CODE § 78(d) (West 2005);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1 !-802 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-802 (2004); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 15-2-802 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. i8-A, § 2-802 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.28oi (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-812 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2353
(2OO4); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-802 (West 2005); N.D. CEr. CODE § 30.1-10-02 (2003); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-802 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-802 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. §
31-1-102 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802 (West 2005); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 851.30 (West
2005).
Pursuant to case law, at least three jurisdictions follow a principle similar to the UPC.
See Shaw v. Saxman, 46 App. D.C. 526, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1917) (separation agreement does not
terminate marital property rights of surviving spouse unless it does so expressly); In ir Estate
of Carlisle, 653 N.W.2d 368, 369-70 (Iowa 2002) (finding separate maintenance decree does
not result in loss of rights to widow allowance); Coleman v. Coleman, 269 S.W.zd 730, 738 (Ky.
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recognizes that marital privacy is to be protected both during life and at
death. No exceptions should be made for the harmed individual who ob-
tains a legal separation that does not terminate property rights, initiates a
divorce action but dies before the divorce is finalized, or merely has suf-• 66
ficient grounds for legal separation or divorce. States that have adopted
such lesser standards have created "black holes" that can make a surviving
spouse ineligible for probate rights because sufficient grounds for divorce
exist and, tragically, also ineligible for a property award pursuant to the di-
vorce proceedings because the divorce was not decreed at the time of the
decedent's death. 6 , Yet even if such "black holes" can be repaired by bet-
ter statutory drafting or reliance on judicial equity, lesser standards invite
ongoing considerations of marital conduct and fault. Probate courts may bei68
tempted to abuse their discretionary power. Requiring a final judgment
also ensures that the true intention is to terminate the relationship and
thereby sever all spousal rights. This prevents the possibility of terminat-
ing spousal rights when the parties may have reconciled, had the decedent
1954) (acknowledging that, in the case of a divorce from "bed and board," inheritance rights
are maintained).
166 In at least five jurisdictions, however, a divorce or legal separation explicitly termi-
nating the status of husband and wife or property rights is not necessary. A legal separation,
physical separation or sufficient grounds for divorce or legal separation may be sufficient to
terminate spousal inheritance rights. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2433 (2004) (forfeiture of
marital fourth for engaging in any fault); LA. CIv. CODE. ANN. art. 2437 (2004) (forfeiture of
family allowance for engaging in any fault); In re LaBorde, 540 So. 2d at 969-70 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (finding any fault of the surviving spouse which would have entitled the decedent to a
divorce or separation sufficient to deny the statutory rights to a marital provision and periodic
allowance); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:19 (2004) (denying spousal inheritance rights when
the surviving spouse "was or had been guilty of conduct which constitutes cause for divorce);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-i (West zoo5) (denying elective share to a surviving spouse if at the
time of the decedent's death the parties are "living separate and apart" or "ceased to cohabit
as man and wife," either as a "result of a judgement of divorce from bed and board" or under
circumstances providing cause of action for divorce or nullity of marriage); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31A-i (West 2005) (loss of spousal probate rights in the event of "divorce from bed
and board"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 114.i35 (West 2003) (providing court discretion to deny
or reduce a surviving spouse's elective share if the parties are "living apart at the time of the
death of the decedent, whether or not there is a judgment for legal separation."); see also In
re Hitchcock, 391 A.2d 882, 883 (N.H. i978) (limiting statutory disinheritance to fault based
grounds of divorce).
167 In Carry. Car-, this tragedy was further compounded as the probate statute prohib-
ited inheritance of the surviving spouse as long as grounds for divorce were established by
either party. In that case, it was the decedent who had been the at-fault party. See Carr v. Carr,
576 A.2d 872, 874, 877 n.2 (N.J. 199 o ) (citing STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 81
(1988) for the court's "black hole" metaphor). For earlier discussions of Carr, including the
court's ultimate conclusion to impose a constructive trust on the decedent's estate, see supra
note 46 and accompanying text.
I68 In the divorce setting, judicial abuse of this "inherently limitless" power significantly
contributed to the promotion of no-fault divorce standards. See A.L.I., supra note 103, at 50.
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lived.'6 It also ensures all substantive and procedural due process require-
ments are met by providing the divorce court, not the probate court, the
opportunity to hear from both parties and make a legal determination as to
whether the grounds for divorce have been established.'7 °
B. Disinheritance by Will
As an alternative to securing a divorce or an appropriate legal separation,
a married individual can certainly limit a spouse's inheritance by explicit
exclusion or omission from one's will. Assuming the nonexistence of fault-
based disinheritance statutes, a testamentary measure will not terminate
the elective share of a spouse who has engaged in acts of emotional mis-
conduct.'' Yet the will can serve as a valid, albeit more limited, means of
ensuring certain rights and privileges are eliminated when a spouse feels
aggrieved but does not want to go to the length of securing a divorce or
separation. Again, the expectation that the aggrieved spouse take the nec-
essary legal action may initially seem inappropriate. However, placing the
burden on the victim is necessary in order to maintain a consistent no-fault
standard.
C. Rejecting the Behavior Test
Rather than eliminating fault determinations, others invite greater judicial
involvement. Rejecting sole reliance upon one's legal relationships, Profes-
sor Frances Foster considers various theories which would allow estates
to be distributed upon case-by-case determinations regarding the quality
and validity of the decedent's relationship with both relatives and nonrela-
tives. It may be tempting to support such a proposition in order to recog-
169 The frequency of reconciliation may explain why divorce actions may be dismissed
by the courts if after a set period of time no action has been taken by the parties. See, e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-15-2-15(c) (West 2005) (dismissing dissolution action if no action taken within
90 days from the date of continuance).
17o Even in the no-fault divorce context, a judicial determination that the grounds of
divorce have been established may only be made in accordance with due process. See, e.g.,
Manion v. Manion, 363 A.2d 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976) (denying a motion for default
judgement in a divorce action without an evidentiary hearing at which testimony could be
heard).
171 For further discussion of the elective share and the implications of fault, see supra
notes 77 and accompanying text (for a general definition of elective share), 55-56 and ac-
companying text (recognizing the elective share as a mechanism to acknowledge the joint
property rights of spouses regardless of emotional misconduct).
172 After briefly raising and rejecting either altogether "abolishing inheritance" or "purg-
ing" any consideration of family, Professor Foster more seriously evaluates three other alter-
native approaches to distributing a decedent's estate. Such approaches "append[] non-family
categories" to family categories based upon evaluations of actual dependence or support, rely
upon the "decedentl's] intent" to recognize the "natural objects of the decedent's bounty,"
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nize same-sex relationships that still-cannot be legally created through mar-
riage.' 73 However, the denigration of the marital right of privacy to achieve
such recognition takes the law in the wrong direction. The demand must
be for more privacy not less. Instead of proposing a standard that" would
result in less privacy rights for opposite-sex couples, more rights must be
advocated for same-sex couples.
D. Maintaining the Physical Harm Preclusion
Certainly, elimination of the traditional emotional fault standard does not re-
quire abolishing the slayer statutes. 7 4 One can easily differentiate between
a murderer and one who commits the more emotional harms of adultery,
abandonment, and desertion. The elimination of fault in probate arguably
also still allows for disinheritance in certain cases of extreme physical vio-
lence, even if death does not result.' s7 Nor does the preclusion for bigamy
need to be discarded, as such preclusion is grounded in equity rather thanfa"176 v
fault. However, by eliminating forfeiture for the more emotional harms, a
and recognize the "actual relationship" between the decedent and other individuals by rely-
ing upon various factors such as financial, legal, and emotional ties. Frances H. Foster, The
Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 8o N.C. L. REV. 199, 251-271 (2001); see also Frances H.
Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance? The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIs
L. REV. 77, 124-26 (1998) (recognizing the advantages of China's "behavior-based model of
inheritance").
173 Same-sex marriage is now a matter of overwhelming controversy, with the right to
legal recognition of such relationships being raised before legislatures and courts throughout
the country. As this Article goes to press, Massachusetts is the only state which, by judicial
order, recognizes same-sex marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.zd 941
(Mass. 2003), appeal dismissed, Doyle v. Goodridge, 827 N.E.zd 1255 (Mass. 2005). More re-
cently, the city of New York's ban on same-sex marriages has been judicially struck down, but
reinstated. See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005), rev'd, 8o5 N.Y.S.2d
354 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
In other states, constitutional amendments have been relied upon to prevent same-sex
marriages. While it is difficult to remain abreast of all the ongoing national developments, for
a discussion of legislative and judicial efforts at the time of this article, see Monica Davey,
Sharp Reactions to Missouri's Decisive Vote Against Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A16;
Sarah Kershaw, Constitutional Bans on Same-Sex Marriage Gain Widespread Support in to States,
N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 3, 2004, at P6.
174 For discussion of the slayer statutes, see supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
175 In Illinois, for example, a conviction for elder abuse results in the loss of all rights
of descent and inheritance. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.2(b) (West 2005). There have
also been proposals to more broadly require forfeiture in certain cases of domestic violence.
See, e.g., Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposalfor Reform, 13 LAW &
INEQ. 401 (1995); Thomas H. Shepherd, It's the a1st Century... Time for Probate Codes to Address
Family Violence: A Proposal that Deals with the Realities of the Problem, 20 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REv. 449 (2001).
176 For a discussion of the treatment of bigamy in probate, see supra notes 25-33 and
accompanying text.
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consistency with our "common understanding" of marriage is maintained.
Marriage is a privacy right. Without decisive legal action dissolving that
right, the state cannot intrude. Admittedly, some cases will arise where per-
petrators seem to be unduly rewarded. Yet such costs are outweighed by
the damage to marital privacy if fault remains in probate.
CONCLUSION
Marriage may be the "creation of morality," 177 but the morality of marriage
defies legal definition. It is precisely this lack of definition which makes ev-
ery effort to regulate marital behavior controversial. Yet in whatever arena
the debate about marriage plays out, privacy ultimately prevails. The trans-
formation of divorce law into a no-fault system exemplifies the acknowl-
edgment of marriage as a right uniquely belonging to every individual. By
adopting no-fault standards, probate law may easily follow the direction of
no-fault divorce law and recognize that the individual right of marriage is
best protected when left alone.
177 DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 61.
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